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Abstract
Nowadays many systems require end users to authenticate themselves. Authentication
is one of the security activities that end users perform the most. Thus, the usability of
this security feature plays a major role in the proper utilization and adoption of a novel
authentication method.
This dissertation presents coauthentication, a novel authentication system. Many authen-
tication methods and protocols exist, but passwords remain the predominant authentication
method used. Coauthentication is presented here in detail in several possible variations and
their associated protocols, with performance comparisons.
This dissertation also presents a framework to evaluate authentication methods in terms
of usability. A large body of literature pertaining to the usability of computer systems is
available; however, comparing the usability of authentication methods remains difficult due
to the different techniques available. Several usability methodologies are reviewed as well as
several overall comparison tools used to compare authentication methods.
A study of 43 participants, following the framework presented, evaluates coauthentication
against passwords on two different entry devices, a laptop and a smartphone, and against fin-
gerprints on a smartphone. The study results provide a promising framework for comparing
usability of authentication techniques.
vi
Chapter 1: Introduction
Authentication is one of the most common security activities end users perform. Due to
this activity being reoccurring, time consuming, and often considered annoying [2], users tend
to prefer authentication with minimal effort on their part. Thus, in order for end users to
adopt a new authentication method, usability is crucial. Due to the usability and popularity
of passwords, a novel authentication method also needs to yield significantly better results
than a password-based authentication method [3].
1.1 Coauthentication’s Background
As is well understood, user authentication is based on factors, the three standard factors
being what you know (human-entered secrets like passwords), what you have (physical tokens
like keys, electronic remote controls, or smartcards), and what you are (biometrics like
fingerprints). Every authentication system, regardless of the factors used, is based on secrets,
which could take the form of passwords, patterns of metallic teeth on keys, radio frequencies
at which devices transmit data, codes stored on devices and transmitted, fingerprints, etc.
Authentication systems aim to protect against attackers who have not obtained the required
secrets.
Each authentication factor has advantages and disadvantages [4]. For example, tokens are
susceptible to theft, but doing so in the obvious way requires physical access. Users will often
notice physical theft of a token more readily than a remote theft or guessing of a password
or biometrics. However, tokens have traditionally relied on special-purpose hardware and
consequently been more expensive to implement and deploy than other factors. In addition,
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usability benefits of tokens have traditionally been offset by the costs of having to carry and
handle the tokens [4, 5]. Some attacks are also capable of bypassing authentication requiring
a password [6, 7].
Multi-factor authentication attempts to improve security by requiring successful attacks
to compromise every factor being used [8]. One two-factor mechanism combines a username
and password with a second password (a one-time password, OTP) texted to the user’s
phone [9]. Alternatively, instead of receiving an OTP from the authenticator, the phone
may share a cryptographic key with the authenticator and generate its own OTP, called a
time-based OTP or TOTP, as a cryptographic hash, using the shared key, of the current
time [10]. A benefit of such mechanisms is that the physical-token factor is a device already
possessed and carried by the user, thus avoiding expensive, dedicated hardware.
However, multi-factor techniques add the inconveniences of each factor required. For
example, because OTP and TOTP techniques require users to enter two passwords and
carry a registered device, they suffer from the nontrivial usability drawbacks of password-
based authentication mechanisms (e.g., [11, 12, 13, 14, 15]) and the inconvenience of having
to access a mobile device to authenticate.
This latter inconvenience, of having to access one’s registered mobile device to authenti-
cate, has lessened over time, as the overwhelming majority of adults have gone from having
zero personal smart devices accessible at all times to having one personal smart device—a
smartphone—accessible at all times [16].
With the growth of the Internet of Things, ubiquitous computing, and wearable, edi-
ble, and implantable devices, the overwhelming majority of adults may soon have multiple
personal smart devices accessible at all times, all of which can be registered and used to
authenticate. For example, to log in to a website, open a door, or start an engine, two of
a user’s registered devices, perhaps a smartphone and smartwatch, might participate in the
authentication. A gate or garage door might authenticate a request to open by requiring
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participation from both a registered car and a registered smartphone; then stealing only the
car, or only the phone, would be insufficient for opening the door.
Even today many people only authenticate to certain services when multiple of their
devices are present. For example, a user U may log in to banking services only from a
certain PC while in the presence of U ’s smartphone. In this case the banking service could
register these two user devices to U and require their participation in every authentication
of U . Because the PC and smartphone are separate and heterogeneous, successfully stealing
or otherwise attacking one device does not imply a successful attack on the other device. It
is therefore of value to protect against attacks on only one of the two user devices.
We call this single-factor technique, in which multiple devices collaborate to authenticate
a user, coauthentication. The user devices collaborate through cryptographic protocols, such
that an authenticator receives message(s) proving that all required user devices approve
the authentication. Attackers who steal only one of the user devices cannot authenticate,
because the unstolen device will not approve the authentication.
Benefits of coauthentication include protecting against the compromise of authentication
secrets (cryptographic keys); preventing phishing, replay, and man-in-the-middle attacks;
basing authentication on high-entropy secrets that can be generated and updated automat-
ically; avoiding the inconveniences of factors like passwords and biometrics; implementing
advanced authentication functionalities, including m-out-of-n, continuous, group, shared-
device, and anonymous authentication; and, when implementing m-out-of-n authentication,
providing availability protections against device misplacement and denial-of-service attacks.
1.2 Authentication Usability Methodology
As explained previously authentication methods are based on three standard factors. Due
to the fundamental differences between these factors, comparing authentication methods
using different factor(s), especially in terms of usability, is not trivial.
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Bonneau et al. introduced a subjective framework which provides a qualitative scale to
compare authentication methods [3]. While offering a good assessment of authentication
methods under a thorough list of categories, this framework remains a high-level overview
for each category (e.g., usability). Usability is highly subjective, and thus, depends on the
perception of users. Therefore, feedback from participants is necessary to obtain a more
precise comparison. Another standard approach to compare authentication methods is the
System Usability Scale (SUS), which is an effective metric for usability comparison [17, 18].
However, SUS only captures the satisfaction aspect of usability. SUS collects feedback from
users through a questionnaire answered via a Likert scale that provides a score from 0 −
100 [19].
The experimental framework presented provides a solution to compare all authentication
methods in terms of usability, regardless of the authentication factor(s). The framework in-
corporates the System Usability Scale and other metrics (e.g., time of completion, accuracy)
to compare authentication methods.
1.3 The Framework’s Motivation and Background
This section introduces the design principles of the framework. The framework presented
in here focuses on the usability aspect of authentication methods and incorporates multiple
metrics that can be applied for usability comparison [20].
To collect ecologically sound data, a scenario close to reality needs to be designed. Users
do not choose to authenticate but are, instead, interrupted by authentication requirement(s).
Authentication happens when users are accessing some resources requiring them to prove
their identity. Thus, an activity representing a specific action being interfered with should
be defined to reproduce a real use of an authentication method. Participants can attempt to
complete the activity while being obstructed by authentication requirements. For example,
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users may be required to authenticate when accessing a website, while calling a support
service, participating in a teleconference, or carrying on a conversation.
Authentication usually interferes with the access of some resources, thus, dual-task inter-
ference is a suitable technique to study user perception of authentication methods [21, 22].
In the field of cognitive psychology, dual-task interference is used to determine a person’s
cognitive load and ability to multitask. Due to the results of dual-task interference, the
framework requires participants to undergo a dual-task interference game in addition to
performing each authentication technique in a standalone manner.
The framework should collect information on authentication methods performed in a
standalone manner to provide a baseline to compare with the data collected during the
dual-task interference game (i.e., DTI game). This part serves as a training phase and
allows participants to get accustomed to each of the authentication techniques evaluated.
Prior to the DTI game, another training phase is helpful to familiarize participants with the
game. The data resulting from this training can also be helpful in detecting improvements.
The training phases should require participants to complete, first the activity, second the
authentication tasks, and finally, both simultaneously to engage with the DTI game.
Gamification is a compelling incentive that pushes participants to complete experiments,
and, in turn, produces meaningful data in case studies [23, 24, 25]. The experiment includes
a multi-tasking game to actively engage participants. A scoreboard is a type of gamification
element that gives feedback to the participant on their performance and provides an incentive
to surpass themselves. The participant’s score should be updated in real time to provide
direct feedback. Participants’ compensation can be based on their score, as an additional
compelling incentive. Figure 1.1 shows a screenshot of the web application used, with the
progress bar on the top left, the participant’s score in the circle on the top right, and in the
middle the authentication requirement.
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Figure 1.1: Screenshot of the multitasking game while authenticating via
coauthentication.
1.4 Contributions
1.4.1 Coauthentication’s Contributions
Coauthentication is the first single-factor, multi-device technique for authenticating users
without passwords or biometrics.
Chapter 2 introduces and evaluates coauthentication, including several specific coauthen-
tication system designs, protocols, and implementations. It makes the following contribu-
tions.
• Example coauthentication system designs, attack models, policies, and applications
are presented (Section 2.1).
• Coauthentication protocols, having strong two-way authentication and forward-secrecy
properties, are defined (Section 2.2).
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• The principal security properties of the coauthentication protocols are formally verified,
using ProVerif [26, 27], under a small set of explicitly stated, realistic assumptions
(Section 2.3).
• The implementability and performance of the coauthentication protocols are evaluated
(Section 2.4).
• Several extensions and generalizations of coauthentication are provided (Section 2.5).
• In a discussion of related work, it is shown that existing authentication techniques,
specifically those like OTPs that may involve multiple user devices, can also benefit
from the coauthentication protocols (Section 2.6).
Section 5.2 concludes and Section 5.3.1 describes future work.
1.4.2 The Framework’s Contributions
The framework is used to evaluate the following usability aspects of authentication meth-
ods:
• Efficiency, which is the authentication’s completion time.
• Effectiveness, which is the success rate.
• Satisfaction, which is rated via participants’ feedback.
Efficiency is defined as the length of time necessary for a user to be authenticated.
Thus, this time is calculated from the first user action performed to authenticate until the
user receives the authentication result. Additionally, this time takes into account the user-
interaction time required to perform an authentication task.
To compare authentication methods fairly, regardless of the authentication factor and
in terms of usability, a success rate is essential. False positives directly affect the usability
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of an authentication method, and in practice, re-authenticating due to a failed attempt,
with a certain limit to prevent brute-force attacks, is allowed to improve usability. The
purpose for allowing retries is to reduce the inconvenience induced from forcing users to
re-authenticate. False negative and false positive rates are metrics used to determine the
security and usability of biometric authentication methods [28]. However, other types of
authentication factors are less subject to accuracy problems. Accuracy will be used as a
metric to determine the effectiveness of each authentication method evaluated.
Satisfaction is the subjective perception of usability. To collect participants’ feedback
the framework uses the Authentication Experience Questionnaire (see Appendix B), which
includes the System Usability Scale (SUS) questionnaire and various feedback questions. SUS
is a widely used and accepted approach to determine the usability of a computer system [17,
29].
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Chapter 2: Coauthentication
Coauthentication is the first single-factor, multi-device technique for authenticating users
without passwords or biometrics [30, 31, 32, 33, 34].
To provide the reader with a more complete understanding of coauthentication and its
benefits this dissertation also reports on the results of work performed by Cagri Cetin [35].
Specifically Cagri Cetin implemented the formal verification and performed the evaluation
as part of the coauthentication project, in which we both participated.
This section introduces and evaluates coauthentication, including several specific coau-
thentication system designs, protocols, and implementations. It makes the following contri-
butions.
• Example coauthentication system designs, attack models, policies, and applications
are presented (Section 2.1).
• Coauthentication protocols, having strong two-way authentication and forward-secrecy
properties, are defined (Section 2.2).
• The principal security properties of the coauthentication protocols are formally verified,
using ProVerif [26, 27], under a small set of explicitly stated, realistic assumptions
(Section 2.3).
• The implementability and performance of the coauthentication protocols are evaluated
(Section 2.4).
• Several extensions and generalizations of coauthentication are provided (Section 2.5).
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• In a discussion of related work, it is shown that existing authentication techniques,
specifically those like OTPs that may involve multiple user devices, can also benefit
from the coauthentication protocols (Section 2.6).
2.1 Coauthentication System Designs, Policies, and Applications
The devices involved in coauthentication are the authenticator (e.g., a server deciding
whether to authenticate a user), the requestor (on which the current authentication attempt
is initiated), and one or more collaborators. The requestor and collaborator(s) are registered
with the authenticator, meaning that the devices have access to a secret that the authenti-
cator can use to verify the devices’ participation in an authentication. This secret accessible
to the requestor and collaborator(s) may, for example, be a secret key shared with the au-
thenticator, or a private key K such that the authenticator can verify signatures created
with K.
In some coauthentication protocols, the authenticator, upon receiving an authentication
request, issues one or more challenges and awaits one or more valid responses to the challenges.
Other protocols avoid authentication challenges. In all cases, the authenticator verifies that
multiple registered devices, more specifically the secret keys accessible to those devices,
participate in the authentication.
2.1.1 Attack Models and Assumptions
Coauthentication, like multi-factor techniques, protects against theft of any one authen-
tication secret. The secrets in coauthentication are cryptographic keys. Theft of coauthenti-
cation secrets may occur in any way, including by remotely compromising devices to obtain
their stored keys or physically stealing devices.
Attackers are assumed to be active and can eavesdrop on, insert, delete, and modify
communications. Attackers may mount replay and man-in-the-middle attacks.
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Authenticator Requestor Collaborator
1)R, {AuthReq,N1}KAR
2)A, {R, {CollabReq, C,N2, K̂AR, K̂AR}KAR}KAC
3)A, {CollabReq, C,N2, K̂AR
, K̂AR}KAR
4)R, {CollabResp, C,N2}K̂AR
5)A, {KSK , C,N1}K̂AR
6)R, {Acknowledgement}KSK
Figure 2.1: The full coauthentication protocol. Secret key KAR (KAC) is shared between
authenticator and requestor (collaborator). Each Ni is a nonce, and {M}K is the
encryption of M using key K. The third message is sent through a private channel.
Attackers are however assumed to be incapable of cryptanalysis; attackers can only infer
plaintexts from ciphertexts when also having the required secret key. Without such an
assumption, attackers could extract credentials like session keys simply by monitoring and
cryptanalyzing legitimate authentications.
Some coauthentication protocols protect against attackers who know all the secrets stored
on a device that the victim user possesses. We call such attacks key-duplication attacks. For
example, an attacker may duplicate a device’s secret keys by remotely compromising the
device. Alternatively, the attacker may physically steal a device, duplicate all keys accessible
to the device, and return the device to the victim user, who may be unaware of the theft
and duplication.
To protect against key-duplication attacks, the coauthentication protocols assume that a
private communication channel, inaccessible to attackers, exists between the requestor and
collaborator devices. Such an assumption is necessary because the duplicated keys must be
updated through some channel inaccessible to the attacker; otherwise, the attacker—who has
all of the victim device D’s keys—could decrypt and obtain any updated keys sent to D, and
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modify any updated keys sent from D. Private channels may be implemented with short-
range communications, such as NFC, zigbee, wireless USB, infrared, or near-field magnetic
induction, under the assumption that attackers cannot access such communications because
they are on direct, device-to-device channels.
Other coauthentication protocols do not require a private channel between requestor
and collaborator devices. Although these protocols do not protect against key-duplication
attacks, they do protect against attackers who obtain keys by stealing devices (without
duplicating the keys in, and returning, the devices). In other words, the attack model for
these all-public-channel protocols assumes that if an attacker has obtained a device D’s
authentication secret, then D’s legitimate user no longer possesses D.
All of this dissertation’s coauthentication protocols assume that devices in the user’s
possession run as intended during the coauthentication process. Without such an assump-
tion, malware on the user’s requestor device could simply leak decrypted session keys or any
other unencrypted private data, and malware on the user’s collaborator device could simply
approve an attacker’s authentication requests. Protecting against malware that is actively
running on a device in the user’s possession, while the user is authenticating, is beyond the
scope of coauthentication.
All of this dissertation’s coauthentication protocols also assume that authenticators run
as intended during the coauthentication process. Without such an assumption, malware on
the authenticator could simply leak secrets or allow all authentication requests. Protecting
against malware on authenticators is beyond the scope of coauthentication.
2.1.2 Collaboration Policies
Each collaborator may enforce its own policy defining the circumstances under which it
participates in a coauthentication.
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For example, a collaborator may only participate in an authentication after a user has
clicked a button or provided some other input to confirm participation. Under this policy,
if an attacker steals or compromises the requestor and initiates a coauthentication, the
legitimate user will not confirm the attacker-initiated authentication on the collaborator, so
the authentication attempt will fail.
Alternatively, a collaborator may automatically participate in an authentication but warn
the user, or log, that it has done so, for example by displaying a text alert with an audible
warning sound (e.g., a text message). The alert could provide a simple interface for the user
to notify the authenticator if the collaboration was unauthorized (i.e., an attacker-initiated
authentication).
The first of these example policies, which we call the disallow-by-default collaboration
policy, only collaborates when a user confirms the authentication. The second policy, which
we call the allow-by-default-with-warning collaboration policy, relies on users to observe a
warning and handle unauthorized collaborations after the fact. For many applications the
usability benefits of the allow-by-default-with-warning policy may outweigh the security
costs; many modern authentication systems email or text users after suspicious logins and
request after-the-fact notification of unauthorized access.
Additional collaboration policies are possible. For example, a collaborator could decide
whether to participate in a coauthentication based on the requestor’s proximity, that is,
whether the requesting device is co-located with the collaborator. In applications where
the attack vector of concern is device theft, a collaborator may presume that a co-located
requestor has not been stolen. Such a collaborator may tacitly allow collaborations with
co-located requestors but show warnings for, require explicit confirmations for, or disallow
entirely, collaborations with non-co-located requestors.
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When run automatically, without requiring user interaction, coauthentication is a zero-
interaction authentication system [36]. Zero-interaction systems are well suited to continuous
authentication [36, 37].
2.2 The Full Coauthentication Protocol
Figure 2.1 illustrates the full coauthentication protocol for two user devices. Authentica-
tion secrets in this protocol are shared symmetric-cryptography keys, and there is only one
collaborator.
Following the flow of data in Figure 2.1, the full protocol operates as follows. Assume
that during device registration, the authenticator A and requestor R share a secret key KAR,
and the authenticator A and collaborator C share a secret key KAC .
1. Requestor R initiates the coauthentication by sending the authenticator A its ID and
an encrypted authentication-request message containing a challenge nonce N1 (which
serves to authenticate A to R).
2. Authenticator A receives and decrypts the request message, finds that the requestor
R is registered to a user having collaborating device C, creates a challenge nonce N2
(which serves to authenticate R to A), generates two new keys (K̂AR and K̂AR) to
share with R (to rotate keys, to ensure forward secrecy and prevent key-duplication
attacks), and double encrypts these data in a collaboration-request message to C,
the first (inner) encryption using KAR and the second (outer) encryption using KAC .
By double encrypting nonce N2, the authenticator ensures participation of both user
devices’ secret keys (KAR and KAC) in the coauthentication.
3. Collaborator C receives and decrypts the previous message, verifies the identity of the
requestor, and forwards the decrypted message (which is still ciphertext encrypted with
KAR) to requestor R through a private channel.
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4. Requestor R receives and decrypts this message using KAR, verifies the identity of the
collaborator, and obtains N2, K̂AR, and K̂AR. The requestor then generates and sends
the authenticator a collaboration-response message containing N2 encrypted with its
first updated key, K̂AR. The requestor saves the second updated key, K̂AR, for a future
coauthentication request.
5. Authenticator A receives the collaboration-response message, decrypts, and verifies
the collaborator’s identity and that the received nonce matches the N2 it sent earlier.
Because A has now verified participation of both keys KAR and KAC , it sends an
authentication-complete message, for example containing a session key KSK , to the
requestor R.
6. Requestor R sends an acknowledgment to the authenticator.
Timestamps may be added to these messages, for example to implement timeouts or fine-
grained logging.
Notice that full coauthentication stores three keys long term: KAR may be stored long
term before the current round of authentication, K̂AR may be stored long term after the
current round of authentication, and KAC may be stored long term before and after the
current round of authentication.
2.2.1 Properties of the Full Protocol
The full coauthentication protocol uses nonces to authenticate the requestor and authen-
ticator to each other—session keys are only shared between mutually authenticated devices.
Requestor R only shares session keys with authenticated As, and authenticator A only shares
session keys with authenticated Rs.
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Authenticator Requestor Collaborator
1)R, {AuthReq,N1}KAR 2)A,CollabReq, {N1, K̂AR, K̂AR}KAR
3)C, {CollabResp,R, {N1, K̂AR, K̂AR}KAR}KAC
4)A, {KSK , C,N1}K̂AR
5)R, {Acknowledgement}KSK
Figure 2.2: A coauthentication protocol omitting authenticator challenges. The second
message is sent through a private channel.
Authenticator Requestor Collaborator
1)A,CollabReq,N1, {AuthReq,N1, K̂AR, K̂AR}KAR
2)C, {CollabResp,R,N1, {AuthReq,N1, K̂AR, K̂AR}KAR}KAC
3)A, {KSK , C,N1}K̂AR
4)R, {Acknowledgement}KSK
Figure 2.3: A challengeless coauthentication protocol incorporating message forwarding.
The first message is sent through a private channel.
The full protocol also employs key rotation to ensure forward secrecy. An attacker who
acquires the keys stored long term on at most one user device cannot obtain past session
keys. Each session key KSK is encrypted with an updated K̂AR.
The full protocol mitigates man-in-the-middle attacks by making the authentication se-
crets shared between the authenticator and user devices be cryptographic keys, used to
encrypt communications. In contrast, man-in-the-middle attacks may be possible on pass-
word or biometrics systems because the authenticator may only share, with users or user
devices, secrets that are insufficient for cryptographic use. For example, a man-in-the-middle
attack on an OTP system may proceed as follows: the victim enters a username and pass-
word on a fake website; the fake website forwards this information to the real website, which
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then issues an OTP; the victim receives and enters the OTP into the fake website; the at-
tacker completes the authentication on the real website and masquerades as the user. In
this case the shared username/password (or hash thereof) is insufficient for providing the
cryptographic properties needed to mitigate man-in-the-middle attacks.
Now suppose an attacker acquires the long-term secrets stored on at most one user device.
Acquiring KAC only enables an attacker, even one with access to the private channel, to
permit or deny authentications initiated by the victim. Attackers are already assumed to be
active and consequently capable of denying service by dropping network messages. Acquiring
KAC therefore provides an attacker with no new capabilities (and Section 2.5.1 describes
extensions of coauthentication that mitigate denial-of-service attacks on user devices).
On the other hand, acquiring only the KAR to be used in the next coauthentication request
enables an attacker to request authentication, but assuming an appropriate collaboration
policy, the collaborator will notify the victim user of the authentication attempt. From the
victim’s perspective, this attacker-initiated authentication attempt will be unexpected, so
the victim will deny collaboration and therefore the authentication.
Acquiring only the KAR to be used in the next coauthentication request also enables an
attacker mounting a key-duplication attack to wait for and decrypt a legitimate authentica-
tion request coming from the requestor device, still in the victim’s possession. However, such
an attacker only obtains nonce N1 in the process and cannot decrypt any of the remaining
messages in the protocol, because they are either encrypted with different keys or sent on a
private channel. Obtaining KAR and N1 provides an attacker with no new capabilities.
The full coauthentication protocol therefore protects against attackers who have acquired
the long-term secrets stored on at most one user device. ProVerif has been used to formalize
and verify these arguments, as described in Section 2.4.
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2.2.2 Variation: Omitting the Challenge-Response
It is possible to avoid the challenge-response portion of the full coauthentication protocol,
implemented with nonce N2, by having the requestor send two requests, one to the authenti-
cator (to request authentication) and another to the collaborator (to request collaboration).
Figure 2.2 shows such a challengeless protocol. The requestor sends two requests, one
to the authenticator and another to the collaborator, containing the same nonce N1. The
requestor also includes the updated versions of KAR in its collaboration-request message,
which the collaborator forwards to the authenticator. These updated keys are double en-
crypted during transit from the collaborator to the authenticator, protecting the keys against
attackers having obtained at most one of KAR and KAC . After verifying that both the re-
questor and its registered collaborator have participated in an authentication by sending the
same N1, the authenticator sends a new session key to the requestor, encrypted with the
proper updated version of KAR. As in the full protocol, this challengeless version results in
the authenticator and requestor sharing an updated K̂AR, usable in a subsequent run of the
protocol as the new version of KAR.
Having formally verified both the full and challengeless coauthentication protocols, to
our knowledge they provide the same security guarantees. The known tradeoffs between
these protocols relate to performance. The challengeless protocol is expected to be more
efficient overall, due to the omission of challenge creation and the parallelization or batching
of some of the communications (e.g., the first and second messages in Figure 2.2). However,
the computations performed by individual devices may be more efficient in the full version.
For example, from the requestor’s perspective, the challengeless protocol essentially replaces
the computations needed to decrypt the third message and generate the fourth message
of Figure 2.1 with the computations needed to generate the second message of Figure 2.2,
including generating updated versions of KAR. For some user devices, such as IoT devices
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with limited resources, some of these computations may be more expensive than others,
making one protocol more efficient than another for those devices.
2.2.3 Variation: Incorporating Message Forwarding
Figure 2.3 shows a variation of the challengeless protocol that incorporates message for-
warding. The protocol shown in Figure 2.3 is the same as the one shown in Figure 2.2 but
with the collaborator forwarding the authentication-request message to the authenticator on
behalf of the requestor.
2.2.4 Variation: No Private Channels
In cases where a private channel does not exist between the requestor and collaborator,
coauthentication protocols cannot prevent key-duplication attacks. The ability of an at-
tacker, who has acquired all the secrets stored on a user-possessed requestor R, to eavesdrop
on and modify all communications to and from R, makes it impossible to update R’s secrets
without the attacker also obtaining any updates sent to R and modifying any updates sent
from R.
In practice it may be acceptable to dismiss key-duplication attacks by relying on alter-
native mechanisms to mitigate them. For example, a device’s long-term, rarely updated key
KAR may be stored in a trusted platform module (TPM) [38]. With KAR in a TPM, we
might assume that attackers, who possibly have physical access to the requestor R, may be
able to use KAR to initiate authentications on R, but cannot extract KAR from R. That
is, mechanisms like TPMs may mitigate key-duplication attacks by allowing authentication
secrets to be used but not extracted, and therefore not duplicated.
It may also be acceptable to dismiss key-duplication attacks in cases where the threat is
considered remote or private channels simply cannot be implemented or would be costly to
implement.
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Authenticator Requestor Collaborator
1)R, {A,CollabReq,N1, {AuthReq,N1}KAR}KRC
2)C, {CollabResp,R,N1, {AuthReq,N1}KAR}KAC
3)A, {KSK , C,N1}KAR
4)R, {Acknowledgement}KSK
Figure 2.4: An all-public-channel variation of the challengeless coauthentication protocol
with message forwarding (Figure 2.3).
In any of these cases, the coauthentication protocols can be varied to no longer require
a private channel between the requestor and collaborator, yet still protect against non-key-
duplication attacks. The attack model for these all-public-channel protocols assumes that
if an attacker has obtained a device D’s authentication secret, then D’s legitimate user no
longer possesses D. This attack model still covers attacks based on stealing devices and
attempting to authenticate on the stolen devices.
For example, Figure 2.4 shows an all-public-channel variation of the protocol shown in
Figure 2.3. The Figure-2.4 protocol matches the Figure-2.3 protocol, except that data for
updating keys is omitted (because requestor-key updates cannot be confidential in an all-
public-channel scenario in which an attacker has all of the requestor’s secrets), and the
message sent between the requestor and collaborator is encrypted with a shared key KRC
(because this message is sent over a public channel).
The all-public-channel protocols are simpler, and expected to run more efficiently, than
the private-channel protocols but do not protect against key-duplication attacks and do not
satisfy forward secrecy.
In practice a hybrid approach may be preferred: coauthentication keys may be updated
only periodically, using private channels at opportune times, while public-channel protocols
are used in the common case.
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To make an analogy with password-based authentication systems, ideally—from a se-
curity perspective—users would update their passwords on every authentication, to limit
attackers who have acquired passwords. Doing so would be like using the private-channel
protocols for coauthentication. In practice, however, tradeoffs are made, and passwords are
typically updated only rarely [12].
2.3 Formal Evaluation
The principal security properties of the example coauthentication protocols shown in
Figures 2.1–2.4 have been formally verified with ProVerif [26, 27]. ProVerif uses a resolution-
based strategy to verify that protocols satisfy desired security properties. A benefit of using
ProVerif is that it can model arbitrarily many sessions of a protocol running concurrently.
Our ProVerif encodings of the coauthentication protocols, and the properties verified, are
available online [39]. The protocol encodings faithfully follow the communications shown in
Figures 2.1–2.4. The modeling of key updates uses key tables to store dynamically generated
keys [40, p.37].
2.3.1 Assumptions
The protocols were modeled and verified under the assumptions stated in Section 2.1.1.
The private-channel protocols (Figures 2.1–2.3) have strong attack models allowing key-
duplication attacks.
The all-public-channel protocol (Figure 2.4) has a weaker attack model that assumes
authentication secrets (KAR, KAC , and KRC) are only accessible to attackers through device
theft. In terms of the ProVerif encodings, this weaker attack model means that, in cases
where attackers are assumed to know KAR, the collaborator does not respond to collabora-
tion requests. The justification is that if an attacker has acquired KAR, then by assumption
the legitimate user does not possess the requestor, so collaboration requests must be for
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unauthorized, attacker-initiated authentications. It is assumed that, with appropriate col-
laboration policies, users do not approve collaborations for unauthorized authentications.
In all the protocols, attackers are active and may freely eavesdrop on, insert, delete, and
modify communications. Attackers are not constrained to operate according to any of the
protocols.
In addition to arbitrary active attackers, each protocol session runs 3 processes (au-
thenticator A, requestor R, and collaborator C), and the main ProVerif process considers
arbitrarily many sessions of a protocol running concurrently.
2.3.2 Verification Setup
Each protocol was verified in 3 runs.
1. The first run began with attackers knowing no secret keys.
2. The second run began with attackers knowing all the long-term keys accessible to the
collaborator. For the protocols shown in Figures 2.1–2.3, attackers were given KAC ,
and for the protocol shown in Figure 2.4, attackers were given KAC and KRC .
3. The third run began with attackers knowing all the long-term keys accessible to the
requestor. For the protocols shown in Figures 2.1–2.3, attackers were given KAR and
K̂AR, and for the protocol shown in Figure 2.4, attackers were given KAR and KRC .
In all 3 runs of each of the 4 protocols, we attempted to verify the following security
properties.
• P1 Secrecy of the session key: The session key KSK is only known to the authenti-
cator and requestor. This property subsumes forward secrecy of session keys in the
third run of the private-channel protocols (Figures 2.1–2.3) because knowing the re-
questor’s future authentication secret (K̂AR, which becomes KAR in the next round of
authentication) does not leak session keys.
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• P2 Authentication of R to A: With one exception, we specified authentication of R to
A as requiring that if the authenticator receives an acknowledgment of a session key
(and therefore believes it shares the session key with the requestor) then the requestor
was indeed its interlocutor and the collaborator indeed collaborated. This is an event-
based property [41] having the form
endA(beginA ∧ collabA),
where endA refers to the event of A receiving the acknowledgment, beginA to R sending
the authentication request, and collabA to C sending its participation message (in the
third message of Figures 2.1 and 2.2 and the second message of Figures 2.3 and 2.4).
The one exception to encoding P2 in this way is for the second run of the all-public-
channel protocol (Figure 2.4), where the attacker is given KAC and KRC . In this
case, the attacker may use KRC to obtain, and KAC to collaborate with, legitimate
authentication requests, thus helping legitimate authentications succeed, which we do
not consider an attack. Therefore, for the second run of the Figure-2.4 protocol, we
specify property P2 as only requiring
endAbeginA,
that is, if the authenticator believes it shares the session key with the requestor then the
requestor was indeed its interlocutor (but the attacker, rather than the collaborator,
may have collaborated).
• P3 Authentication of A to R: This property is symmetric to P2 and, with one ex-
ception, requires that if the requestor sends an acknowledgment of a session key (and
therefore believes it shares the session key with the authenticator) then the authentica-
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tor was indeed its interlocutor and the collaborator indeed collaborated. This property
has the form
endR(beginR ∧ collabR),
where endR refers to R sending the acknowledgment, beginR to A receiving the au-
thentication request, and collabR to C sending its participation message.
As with P2, the one exception to encoding P3 in this way is for the second run of the
all-public-channel protocol (Figure 2.4), in which case P3 only requires
endRbeginR,
for the same reason explained for property P2.
2.3.3 Verification Results
ProVerif found no attacks on any of properties P1–P3 in any runs of any of the protocols.
That is, ProVerif did not refute any of P1–P3 in any runs of any of the protocols.
ProVerif did prove P1 and P3 for all 3 runs of all 4 protocols, and it proved P2 for all 3
runs of the full coauthentication protocol (Figure 2.1). It also proved P2 for the second and
third runs of the protocol shown in Figure 2.4.
For all runs of the protocols shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, and for the first run of the
protocol shown in Figure 2.4, ProVerif outputs that P2 “cannot be proved”. It produces a
trace in which a man-in-the-middle sits between A and R, and A and C, and simply collects
and forwards all messages sent to and from A. This trace is not an attack because the
authenticator completes the protocols with R having sent the original authentication request
and C having sent its participation message, despite the fact that the attacker touched these
messages while acting as an intermediary.
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Table 2.1: Average performance of the authentication systems over 100 runs with A being
the authenticator, R the requestor, and C the collaborator.
Bytes Application-Layer Time (ms) Authentication
Implementation Transmitted A R C Total Time (ms)
Password 3212 0.28 1.5 — 1.8 136
Figure 2.1 1198 2.58 22.5 18.4 43.5 594
Figure 2.2 1088 1.36 20.1 20.9 42.4 475
Figure 2.3 885 1.16 17.2 19.4 37.8 473
Figure 2.4 1075 0.94 14.9 23.3 39.1 131
We also note that these results are for the stronger, injective-correspondence versions of
properties P2 and P3. The injective-correspondence versions require there to be a unique
predecessor event for each end event [40, pp.19–22]; for example, the injective version of
P2 requires that for each endA event there exists a unique beginA predecessor event. The
non-injective versions allow end events to have non-unique predecessor events. ProVerif was
able to prove the weaker, non-injective version of property P2 for all runs of all protocols.
2.4 Empirical Evaluation
We have implemented and measured the performance of full coauthentication (Figure 2.1)
and the variations shown in Figures 2.2–2.4. To establish a baseline of performance, we also
implemented and measured the performance of a basic password authentication system.
The authenticator in all implementations was the same MacBook Pro laptop, and the
requestor and collaborator in all implementations were the same Android phones, except
that the password-based implementation did not use a collaborator device. In all implemen-
tations, the authenticator, requestor, and collaborator processes ran as Java applications.
The password-based implementation communicated over HTTPS (using 2048-bit RSA
and self-signed certificates), while the coauthentication implementations sent public-channel
messages over TCP on standard Wi-Fi channels. Private-channel messages were sent through
Bluetooth, though it has known vulnerabilities [42].
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All symmetric cryptographic operations were implemented with 256-bit CBC-mode AES
using the standard javax.crypto library, and all (64-bit) nonces, (256-bit) session keys,
and (256-bit) updated-KAR keys were dynamically generated using Java’s cryptographically
strong random number generator class SecureRandom. All other cryptographic keys were
hardcoded, the initial shared keys being assumed to have been shared before the implemen-
tations began running. An (8-character) username and password were also hardcoded for
the password-based implementation.
Each run of each implementation opened new network connections, including a new
Bluetooth connection in the implementations of Figures 2.1–2.3. Connections were never
reused between runs of the implementations, and the Android applications were restarted
for each run.
Each of the implementations was run 100 times, in a uniform environment of normal
(workday) university-network usage and standard loads of kernel and user-level applications
running. The following measurements were made for each run:
• The network usage, that is, the number of bytes transmitted over the course of the run.
Due to unreliability in the communication channels, the number of bytes transmitted
varied with each run. The network usage was measured with Android’s standard
network-monitoring class android.net.TrafficStats.
• The application-layer real time each device consumed. This measurement was made
by starting a timer when beginning to process any newly received message or request,
stopping the timer when finished preparing a response, taking the difference, and sum-
ming all of these times for each device. For example, the application-layer real time
consumed by the authenticator in full coauthentication is the sum of the real times
it consumes processing the requestor’s and collaborator’s messages, including gener-
ating new keys and a challenge nonce and performing the required encryptions and
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decryptions. Application-layer times exclude all time spent establishing connections
and transmitting messages in the underlying TCP, HTTPS, and Bluetooth protocols.
• The total authentication time. This is the real time, measured on the requestor, from
beginning to prepare an authentication request until finishing obtaining a plaintext
session key.
As shown in Table 2.1, the implementations transmitting more or more complex messages,
or using HTTPS, transmitted more bytes of data. Network (i.e., non-application-layer)
activities dominated the performance of all implementations, consuming between 70% and
98.7% of the total authentication time on average.
In terms of application-layer performance, the password system was the most efficient,
benefiting (at the application layer) from pushing all the cryptographic operations into the
underlying HTTPS layer.
In terms of total authentication time, the Figure-2.4 system outperformed the others
on average. The performance of this coauthentication system benefits from transmitting a
smaller number of messages over the efficient (relative to HTTPS and Bluetooth) TCP.
Importantly, these performance results exclude human time, though it is known to be
substantial for password-based authentication systems. Human entry of a password is ex-
pected to take on the order of several seconds [14, 15, 43].
Care should also be exercised when comparing the performance of the password-based sys-
tem with the performance of the private-channel coauthentication systems (Figures 2.1–2.3),
which update KAR on every authentication. The advantages of updating KAR are analogous
to the advantages of updating a password, so a better comparison might take into account
the time required to update passwords. Password update is expected to take on the order
of a minute of human time [44], significantly longer than an automatic coauthentication-key
update.
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We conclude from these results that coauthentication performs efficiently enough to be
practical.
2.5 Extensions and Generalizations
Extensions and generalizations of coauthentication are possible.
2.5.1 Multiple Collaborators, m-out-of-n Policies, and Availability Benefits
There are advantages to systems in which users register more than two devices with an
authenticator. Suppose a user has registered n devices and the authenticator requires any
m of the n devices to coauthenticate, where 2 ≤ m ≤ n. In the coauthentication protocols
described so far, m=n=2, but now suppose m=2 and n=3. In this case, compromising
only one of the user’s devices (i.e., obtaining only one device’s authentication secrets) is still
insufficient for authenticating as that user, because m=2. At the same time, because m<n,
the user can be authenticated even after forgetting or losing a device, or having a device
become inoperable, for example due to a denial-of-service attack.
This m-out-of-n-device policy, enforced at the authenticator, tolerates the absence of
n−m devices. Hence, user-side denial-of-service attacks require denying service to n−m+1
devices. When these devices communicate through heterogeneous channels, denial-of-service
attacks based on jamming or otherwise interfering with specific communication channels
become more difficult to mount.
To prevent attackers from using n−m compromised devices to coauthenticate, m may
be further constrained to be greater than n−m, that is, m > n/2. For example, a system
that requires only 2 out of 4 devices to coauthenticate (i.e., m=2=n/2) tolerates the absence
of 2 devices, but if those 2 devices are absent due to theft, then the thief can use them to
coauthenticate. To prevent such attacks, the m-out-of-n-device policy may be constrained
to 2 ≤ m ≤ n < 2m
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The m-out-of-n-device policy can be generalized further, to policies in which devices
are, for example, (1) weighted in various ways to get above a threshold (e.g., 2 “votes” are
required to authenticate the current user, but each smart shoe only gets half a vote), (2) re-
quired (e.g., 2 devices are required but one must be the user’s smartphone), or (3) excluded
(e.g., high-risk users may not use easily-transferrable smartcards for coauthentication).
2.5.2 Group Coauthentication
Users may also be coauthenticated simultaneously, as a group. Such authentication
subsumes the famous two-person concept for authenticating users who will have access to
nuclear and other weapons [45, 46], or to bank vaults. For example, a two-person policy
may require two users to simultaneously turn four keys, one in each hand, to gain access
to a weapon-deployment system. The goal is to require both users to participate in the
authentication.
Because coauthentication requires participation of multiple devices in an authentication,
it may require participation of multiple users in an authentication, where each user has at
least one registered device. The same coauthentication protocols can be followed to authen-
ticate multiple users’ devices simultaneously. More sophisticated group coauthentications
could, for example, require participation of m-out-of-n devices from each of j-out-of-k users.
2.5.3 Device Sharing and Anonymous Coauthentication
Users may also share devices. For example, a garage-door authenticator may receive a
request from a shared family car and send challenges to all the smartphones of drivers in
the family, or only those smartphones in near-proximity. The smartphones might enforce
the collaboration policy of tacitly participating if co-located with the requestor and not
participating otherwise.
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Alternatively, assume that every collaborator (smartphone) shares the same secret key
with the garage-door authenticator. Then the authenticator may, upon receiving a request
from the family car, respond directly to the car with a challenge requiring participation
from any collaborator—and leave it to the car to obtain a collaborator’s participation. An
interesting aspect of this alternative is the anonymity it provides: the authenticator only
communicates with the shared requestor device and does not know which user has been
authenticated, nor which device has collaborated. Authentications are still protected against
attackers acquiring one of the secret keys.
It is also possible to achieve anonymous coauthentication for systems in which requestor
devices are not shared, by having all potential requestors share the same secret key with
the authenticator. Because coauthenticators verify usage of keys, anonymity is achieved by
having devices share keys.
Of course, these designs only protect anonymity during the authentication process. Au-
thenticators frequently have other opportunities to de-anonymize users, though techniques
like onion routing [47] may mitigate some de-anonymizations.
2.6 Additional Discussion of Related Work
Many existing systems are related to coauthentication.
2.6.1 Threshold Schemes and Multi-Signatures
An (m,n) threshold scheme enables a secret to be divided among n entities, such that
each entity has one piece of the secret and m of the n pieces are required to determine the
secret [48]. An (m,n) threshold scheme has cryptographic benefits analogous to the user-
authentication benefits of an m-out-of-n-device coauthentication policy; both protect against
fewer-than-m entities acting maliciously and at-most-n-minus-m entities being unavailable
to participate.
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Multi-signature schemes similarly enable different users or devices to generate a joint
digital signature [49].
Threshold and multi-signature schemes do not provide coauthentication systems, and
vice versa, as they differ in techniques and goals. Threshold (multi-signature) schemes
contribute techniques for combining secret-pieces (signatures) into a joint secret (signature),
while coauthentication systems require no joint secret or signature. Coauthentication secrets
(i.e., keys) may be used only independently, to indicate one device’s participation in user-level
authentications, without ever being combined. The goals of threshold and multi-signature
schemes focus on combining pieces of cryptographic secrets or signatures into joint secrets
or signatures, while coauthentication’s goals focus on user authentication.
2.6.2 OTPs and Other Techniques Using Multiple Devices
One group of techniques related to coauthentication uses OTPs, as discussed in Sec-
tion 1.1. The standard use of OTPs is as follows. A user enters a username and password
on a requestor device, the authenticator SMS-texts an OTP to the user’s phone (which may
also be the requestor device), and the user sees the OTP and enters it on the requestor
device as a second password required for authentication. This use of OTPs differs from
coauthentication in several ways, perhaps the most significant being that the OTPs are used
in two-factor systems, while coauthentication is a single-factor system. Hence, attackers can
break the OTP portion of authentications by compromising one device, the victim’s phone,
or by reading the SMS messages sent to the phone [9, 50, 51].
Another related group of techniques use multiple devices to acquire multiple passwords
or biometric data [52]. The authenticator combines these data to determine whether to
authenticate a user. For example, if a user has a sensor-device implanted in each finger, then
each device may send data related to that finger’s motion to an authenticator, which can
make authentication decisions based on whether a user has moved or gestured in the proper
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way for that user. Although using multiple devices, this line of work relies on users to enter
passwords or biometrics, which are assumed to be unguessable and unforgeable by attackers.
Coauthentication, like other zero- or low-interaction authentication systems [36], shields
users from attacks based on guessing or forging authentication secrets, such as password
phishing or biometric surveillance. Coauthentication users never have to access or even
understand the secrets required for authentication, and coauthentication secrets can be gen-
erated automatically, with high entropy, and without concern for whether humans have the
resources (cognitive ability, time, etc.) to generate, store, update, or enter the secrets.
Bonneau et al. evaluated authentication techniques, including OTPs, according to three
axes: usability, deployability, and security [53]. A total of 25 criteria are considered along
these axes, such as whether the techniques require users to memorize secrets or carry devices.
As motivated in Section 1, we consider disadvantages related to requiring users to carry
devices to be decreasing. In any case, we believe that coauthentication satisfies the majority
of Bonneau et al.’s criteria, though it is difficult to make precise claims in this respect, due to
subjectivity in the criteria [53, Section V-B]. The most significant criteria coauthentication
does not satisfy relate to deployability; deploying coauthentication, like deploying any new
authentication technique, would require updating authentication clients and servers, and in
some implementations, relying on co-location verification.
2.6.3 Using Coauthentication Protocols to Implement Existing Multi-Device Techniques
Coauthentication protocols can be used to implement existing multi-device authentication
systems.
For example, the full coauthentication protocol shown in Figure 2.1 can implement OTP-
based authentication: the requestor might be a laptop, the initial (static) password might be
included in the initial authentication-request message sent from requestor to authenticator,
the challenge nonce might be the one-time (dynamic) password, the collaborator might be a
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smartphone, the communication from authenticator to collaborator might be through SMS,
and the communication from collaborator to requestor might occur by displaying the OTP-
carrying ciphertext on the smartphone screen and having the user enter it manually on the
laptop.
Similarly, the protocol shown in Figure 2.2 can implement authentication based on bio-
metric data collected from multiple sensors, for example, authentication based on data col-
lected from sensors implanted in fingers [52]. In this case the requestor may request col-
laboration from multiple sensors, each of which transmits its authentication participation—
including motion data collected—to the authenticator. The authenticator collects and con-
siders these participation messages to make authentication decisions.
Implementing existing multi-device authentication systems with coauthentication proto-
cols provides the formally verified security benefits outlined in Section 2.3. These benefits
are sometimes lacking in the existing systems. For example, the protocol shown in Figure 2.1
provides forward-secrecy properties lacking in many existing authentication systems. In ad-
dition, although existing OTP systems are vulnerable to text-message eavesdropping and
man-in-the-middle attacks [9, 50, 51], the coauthentication protocols mitigate these attacks.
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Chapter 3: Usability Experiment Methodology
This chapter details the study (IRB-approved, see Appendix D) methodology according
to the framework’s principles. The study was conducted in a lab where each participant
followed instructions from a web application on a laptop. A researcher also guided them
through the procedure and answered questions. This section will present the authentication
techniques evaluated; then discuss the recruitment process and the resulting demographics;
then we will detail what participants underwent, the specific hardware used, and finally the
limitations associated with such a study.
3.1 Authentication Techniques Evaluated
The authentication techniques evaluated in this paper’s framework represent the three
main authentication factors (i.e., knowledge, inherence, possession). Passwords were chosen
to represent the knowledge factor because of their popularity. A fingerprint authentica-
tion method was chosen to represent the inherence factor, because of the availability of
fingerprint sensors on mobile devices, and because fingerprint authentication has been well
researched [54, 55, 56]. Coauthentication was chosen to represent the possession factor be-
cause this authentication method has never been evaluated [1].
The coauthentication and password authentication methods were completed on two dif-
ferent input devices: a laptop and a phone. Therefore, including fingerprint authentication
on phone, a total of five authentication techniques were evaluated. Testing on two devices
allowed for comparison between input devices.
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Figure 3.1: Overview of the full coauthentication protocol [1, Section 3].
Each of these authentication methods requires a user registration prior to authenticate,
in order to register a password, fingerprint, or device keys (cryptographic secrets used for
coauthentication). Thus, the registration phase was done prior to the start of the experiment.
3.1.1 Fingerprint
The fingerprint authentication method evaluated uses Android’s built-in fingerprint fea-
tures, and the user is authenticated locally. No fingerprint or fingerprint hash is transmitted
over the network. Due to the sensitive nature of fingerprints and the Android security fea-
tures, only a confirmation message is sent to the server to indicate the authentication’s result.
Android stores the hashes of the fingerprint in a trusted execution environment [57].
In this study, only one authentication attempt was accepted, and only one fingerprint
was registered. However, Android policy allows multiple authentication attempts to increase
usability. The reason for a single attempt is to provide standardized accuracy among all
authentication methods compared. In this experiment, none of the authentication methods
allowed for retries.
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3.1.2 Password on Laptop
The password method follows modern standards, using the Password-Based Key Deriva-
tion Function 2 [58, 59] to hash the password with the following arguments: 1000 iterations,
256-bit length, and a salt, all of which are recommended values [60]. The password was
given to the participants, and they had to type it while the username was pre-filled. The
password, “MxmwS88V” is 8 characters long with upper case letters, lower case letters, and
numbers, and therefore satisfies standard policies [61, 43, 62].
These design choices were made for multiple reasons:
1. A set password allows for comparing the typing speeds between participants.
2. Allowing participants to choose their passwords would allow them to create simple
passwords (i.e, easy to type) that meet the minimum requirements in order to maximize
their compensation.
3. Numerous web services keep track of users and pre-fill their usernames.
During the experiment participants were instructed to use only alphanumeric keys to
prevent them from copying and pasting the password.
3.1.3 Password on Phone
This method is included to compare usability results between input devices. The pass-
word authentication technique on phone is the same as password on laptop. The main
difference is that participants have to type the password on the phone’s virtual keyboard.
The password is the same in both methods, and the username is also pre-filled.
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3.1.4 Coauthentication on Laptop
Coauthentication is a new authentication method using the possession factor [1]. This
authentication method is single factor, but multi-device, and its usability has never been
evaluated.
Coauthentication can be implemented with various protocols, each having advantages
and disadvantages. The full coauthentication protocol is the most likely to be implemented,
so it was an ideal candidate to be evaluated. To authenticate, users need two two registered
devices, which will collaborate to perform a challenge-response security protocol.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the underlying protocol of coauthentication, with the requestor
being the laptop and the collaborator being the phone. The implementation of the protocol
uses symmetric keys to encrypt messages with the standard AES cipher in CBC made with
PKCS5Padding.
3.1.5 Coauthentication on Phone
This method is included to compare usability results between the phone and laptop. It
follows the same protocol illustrated in Figure 3.1. However, for this authentication technique
the requestor is the phone and the collaborator is the laptop.
3.2 Related Work of Authentication Usability Methodology
3.2.1 Usability Metrics
The three main aspects of usability (efficiency, effectiveness, and satisfaction) should
be considered to properly assess a system’s usability. Indeed, these aspects are not always
correlated, and assumptions on the overall system’s usability may not be accurate [63, 64, 65].
The satisfaction aspect of an authentication method is often the main research focus as
the adoption of an authentication method depends on end-users. The System Usability Scale
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(SUS) is considered a standard to collect this satisfaction measurement via a study collecting
participants’ perceptions [17, 29, 18, 66, 2]. The questions from the SUS questionnaire are
answered via a Likert scale that allows for the calculation of a usability score from 0 to
100 [19, 67]. This score has been assessed for a wide variety of computer systems and
revealed to be consistent and reliable [68, 69]. SUS is also a recommended metric standard
to compare authentication methods [18].
The review of the following questionnaires, has deemed SUS as the most appropriate
questionnaire to assess [68]:
1. Questionnaire for User Interface Satisfaction (QUIS) [70],
2. System Usability Sacale (SUS) [17],
3. Computer System Usability Questionnaire (CSUQ) [71], and
4. Microsoft’s Product Reaction Cards (MPRC) [72],
The findings show that the data collected via the SUS questionnaire yield the most reliable
result. However, the authors point out the fact that more data, with a greater number of
participants, needs to be conducted to correlate their findings. A crucial point to mention
expressed by the author is the versatility of the SUS questionnaire which focus on a whole
system and not on specific points. This is the main reason to use SUS over other ques-
tionnaires for authentication method usability assessment. Indeed, all questions from the
SUS questionnaire refer to ”the system” which can be replaced by ”authentication method”
and retain meaning. Other questionnaire do not allow for such simple adaptation to which
system is assessed.
The efficiency aspect of usability is more straightforward than the satisfaction aspect as it
can simply be calculated by recording the time to complete tasks. In term of authenticating
the time it takes for user to authenticate can represent the efficiency of an authentication
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method. The completion time should be calculated from the first user action to the result
of the authentication. This would be a fair assessment of an authentication time even for
implicit authentication which determine a user’s credential by analyzing their actions [73].
The effectiveness aspect of usability depends on a user’s ability to perform and achieve
specific goals. In term of authentication the false positive rate and false negative rate in-
dicates the effectiveness. Indeed, an authentication is not effective if it refuses access to a
legitimate user or grants access to an illegitimate user.
Usability is still a field in full expansion especially due to the emergence of new plat-
form and system with different requirement from a standard personal computer or laptop.
Additional aspect have been proposed in the past such as: 1. Fun [74] 2. Aesthetics [75]
3. Sociability [76] 4. Flow [77] 5. Learnability [78] . However, these aspects have not been
agreed upon, can be considered a subset of another aspect, or are specific to the system
assessed.
In Human Computer Interaction usability is still argued on how to properly measured
it and constant improvement is made in this field. Therefore, security researchers focus-
ing on authentication need to take into account new findings and technique that could be
appropriate and related.
The efficiency and effectiveness usability aspect are appropriate and relatively straightfor-
ward to assess when pertaining to authentication because of their quantifiability. However,
the satisfaction aspect, while still being appropriate, can be measured in various ways. More
research with the System Usability Scale (SUS) assess on authentication needs to be pro-
posed; to either develop a novel questionnaire more appropriate or conclude that the SUS
questionnaire is sufficient and/or appropriate enough.
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3.2.2 Authentication Methods Subjective Overall Comparability Methodology
Comparing authentication methods is often achieved by comparing methods as a whole,
which results in a high-level overview of usability [79, 3].
3.2.3 The Quest to Replace Passwords Scale
The Quest to Replace Passwords [3] provides a qualitative scale to compare authenti-
cation and encapsulates the three main aspects of usability: efficiency, effectiveness, and
satisfaction. Table 3.1 illustrate each criterion and their relation to the usability aspects.
However, this scale is difficult to assess objectively to compare authentication methods, due
to the subjective nature of the criteria [3, Section V-B].
Table 3.1: Quest To Replace Password usability criteria categorized depending on their
corresponding usability aspect. A “∼” means that the criteria can be considered part of
the aspect while a “X” means it is and a “×” means it is not.
QTRP usability criteria Usability aspect
Satisfaction Efficiency Effectiveness
U1: Memorywise-Effortless ∼ × ×
U2: Scalable-for-Users ∼ × ×
U3: Nothing-to-Carry ∼ × ×
U4: Effortless ∼ ∼ ×
U5: Easy-to-Learn ∼ ∼ ×
U6: Efficient-to-Use ∼ X ×
U7: Infrequent-Errors ∼ × X
U8: Easy-Recovery-from-Loss × × ×
The following is the description of each of the usability rating illustrated in Table 3.1 as
described by the original author [3]:
• U1 Memorywise-Effortless : Users of the scheme do not have to remember any secrets at
all. We grant a Quasi-Memorywise-Effortless if users have to remember one secret for
everything (as opposed to one per verifier).
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• U2 Scalable-for-Users : Using the scheme for hundreds of accounts does not increase the
burden on the user. As the mnemonic suggests, we mean “scalable” only from the user’s
perspective, looking at the cognitive load, not from a system deployment perspective,
looking at allocation of technical resources.
• U3 Nothing-to-Carry : Users do not need to carry an additional physical object (electronic
device, mechanical key, piece of paper) to use the scheme.Quasi-Nothing-to-Carryis
awarded if the object is one that they’d carry everywhere all the time anyway, such as
their mobile phone, but not if it’s their computer (including tablets).
• U4 Physically-Effortless : The authentication process does not require physical (as opposed
to cognitive) user effort beyond, say, pressing a button. Schemes that don’t offer this
benefit include those that require typing, scribbling or performing a set of motions.
We grant Quasi-Physically-Effortless if the user’s effort is limited to speaking, on the
basis that even illiterate people find that natural to do.
• U5 Easy-to-Learn: Users who don’t know the scheme can figure it out and learn it without
too much trouble, and then easily recall how to use it.
• U6 Efficient-to-Use: The time the user must spend for each authentication is acceptably
short. The time required for setting up a new association with a verifier, although
possibly longer than that for authentication, is also reasonable.
• U7 Infrequent-Errors : The task that users must perform to log in usually succeeds when
performed by a legitimate and honest user. In other words,the scheme isn’t so hard to
use or unreliable that genuine users are routinely rejected.
• U8 Easy-Recovery-from-Loss : A user can conveniently regain the ability to authenticate
if the token is lost or the credentials forgotten. This combines usability aspects such
as: low latency before restored ability; low user inconvenience in recovery (e.g.,no
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requirement for physically standing in line);and assurance that recovery will be possible,
for example via built-in backups or secondary recovery schemes. If recovery requires
some form of re-enrollment, this benefit rates its convenience.
Satisfaction is a highly subjective aspect of usability, therefore relaying on a single or small
group of individuals to assess a qualitative scale, can provide an estimation of the satisfaction
aspect. However, such estimate can be involuntarily biased. For example, the U8 criteria
Easy-Recovery-from-Loss is imprecise on how to define the easiness. One could argue that
recovering by making a phone call is easy while other considering a phone call cumbersome.
In addition, such criteria does not allow for comparison between recovering techniques. For
example, having to send an email versus making a phone call. Examples of this impreciseness
can be thought through for other criteria, indeed two different authentication method can
be assessed as Infrequent-Errors but one may have a higher error frequency than the other.
Additionally, this coarse grained issue of subjective qualitativeness also arise for the
efficiency and effectiveness aspects. Indeed, giving a qualitative rating for these quantitative
aspects does not allow for a precise comparison.
Another specificity of this scale worthy to mention is also the scope of it. The scale aims to
be broader than solely the authentication process. Indeed, the U8 Easy-Recovery-from-Loss
criteria coverage is definitely important as it is the main drawback of some authentication
methods. However, the loss or theft of the authentication secret can be argued to be separate
from the authentication process itself. If recovery in case of loss or theft is a factor taking
into account the registration phase of an authentication method could also be included.
Indeed, some registration phase can be quite cumbersome or difficult to achieve for some
authentication schemes.
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3.2.4 Applicability of Usability Principle to Security Systems
Braz et al., methodology to compare authentication method consist in subjectively de-
scribing if the 8 golden rules [80] of user interface design apply to authentication technique.
These golden rules are:
1. Strive for consistency
2. Frequent users can use shortcuts
3. Provide informative feedback
4. Dialogs should yield closure
5. Prevent errors and provide simple error handling
6. Easy reversal of any action
7. Put the user in charge
8. Reduce short-term memory load
The authors pointed out the inadequacy of these rules in the case of user authentication
and provide descriptions of each of the authentication techniques studied. These descriptions
give a high level understanding of the usability of each of the authentication techniques
studied. However, a subjective description cannot provide a precise comparison across the
spectrum of authentication methods.
The author illustrates a comparison between each of the authentication techniques which,
for usability, only provide the number of golden rule followed. These criteria likely aims to
evaluate the satisfaction aspect of usability. Indeed, the comparison contains separate criteria
for the efficiency and effectiveness aspects.
Assessing the usability of an authentication method subjectively allows for a rough esti-
mate but fail to provide a precise comparison or a comparison at all.
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3.2.5 Usability Methodology for Passwords
As is well known, passwords are the predominant authentication method, and an ex-
tensive literature has evaluated their usability over the last few decades. However, most
usability research specific to passwords is not directly applicable to other authentication
methods. The research mostly pertains to improving the usability of passwords.
In these studies the experimental setup is similar where participants have to type pass-
words and answer questionnaires to collect feedback, demographic data, and often typing
times. Depending on the goal of the study, participants are given the password(s) or are
required to create a password(s).
3.2.6 Password Policies Usability
Recent studies assessed on passwords often focus on the effects of password policies on
usability [43, 81, 82]. Studies usually measure the annoyance of password policies and often
the resulting user behavior.
Many password policies are often enforced without taking into consideration the usability
induced. The security and usability of many combinations of password creation policies have
been compare to find the most adequate in term of security benefit and usability [43].
Password expiration policies are becoming a new standard practice in Universities and
many organizations. This practice can be thought to provide the same benefit than the
principle of key update. However, the research on password policies [82, 83, 84, 62], shows
that user compelled to create new passwords often do so by adding a simple modification
to their previous password (∼ 75% of participants). Zhang et al. [83], were able to crack a
large amount of their organization’s password by using the previous password used.
The methodology employed in password usability studies are either: 1. reasoning on
a dataset of passwords which can help draw conclusion on user behavior 2. or subjecting
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participants to the policy(ies) of interest and gather data on participant’s opinion in addition
to timing data and the passwords themselves. In this case the study can often be more
thorough because research have the opinion of participants but the data is considered not
fully ecologically sound compared to studying “in-use” passwords.
3.2.7 Password Device Entry Usability
Another focus of recent studies is the typing speed of users due to the emergence of
smartphones and the needs to enter passwords on virtual keyboards [14, 85].
In these studies participants are required to construct and/or enter passwords in different
type of keyboards. The data collected and the analysis resulting focuses on the efficiency
and eventually effectiveness of the different keyboard evaluated.
The methodologies employed are not well suited for other authentication technique due
to their specificity. Indeed, in the example of typing speed some research incorporate ef-
fectiveness by investigating the error rate induced by some keyboard but the focus is made
mainly on the efficiency aspect of usability.
3.2.8 Usability Methodology for Biometrics
The focus of biometric usability research is similar to the research on password usabil-
ity in that a biometric method’s usability is typically only compared to other biometric
authentication methods.
For biometric methods the action required for a user to be authenticated, is usually done
by simply scanning the biometric featured required. Therefore, the satisfaction aspect of
biometric is not the main concern. Biometric methods are comparable via a False Acceptance
Rate (FAR) and a False Rejection Rate (FRR) [86, 87, 88, 28]. The FAR is often used to
indicate a level of security while the FRR is often used to indicate a level of usability.
These clearly defined metrics are the reason why biometric methods are easily comparable.
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However, non-biometric authentication technique do not always allow for the calculation of
such metric and therefore cannot be directly compared.
The FRR rates indicate the effectiveness of the authentication methods but does not give
any indication on the efficiency or satisfaction of an authentication technique. The efficiency
aspect is important and depend on the hardware used.
Since effectiveness and satisfaction are not correlated [64, Section 4.5], effectiveness is
insufficient to determining a usability that can be compared to the usability of authentication
methods using other authentication factor(s).
The efficiency and effectiveness of a biometric authentication technique also depends on
its application. Indeed, if the authenticator, the entity determining the user’s identity, has
to match the biometric feature with a single authorize user or among a group of user the
efficiency and effectiveness of the technique will be affected.
For the more established biometric technique such as fingerprint, or face recognition, large
datasets are available to test and determine the FAR and FRR rates. So the methodology
for obtaining a FRR and a FAR rate is to use those datasets.
3.3 Study Recruitment and Demographics
Participants for this study were recruited in various ways. Primarily, the cloud-based
participant pool management software SONA Systems was used through the University
of Florida’s Psychology department to recruit students enrolled in the general psychology
course. Students taking the course were required to sign up for studies, and received 4
credits for participation in addition to the extra compensation based on task performance.
Additional participants were recruited using flyers.
Table 3.2 shows the demographics of the 43 participants enrolled in the study. All
interested participants were accepted; however, the recruitment methods attracted primarily
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Table 3.2: Demographics of the 43 participants enrolled in the study.
Demographic Category
# Participants
(N = 43)
Percentage
Gender
Male 10 28%
Female 33 72%
Age
18 years old 14 34%
19 years old 16 36%
20 years old 9 23%
21 years old 4 7%
Ethnicity and Race
Hispanic or Latino 9 20%
Black 4 9%
Asian 18 40%
White 28 64%
Language
Bilingual 20 45%
Native English 36 82%
college students (all under 22 years old). Additionally, 33 out of the 43 total participants
were female, so this study has a disproportionate representation of the female demographic.
3.4 Study Design
According to the framework guidelines, described previously in Section 1.3, the partici-
pants completed the following steps:
1. The Participant Information Questionnaire
2. A training phase for the authentication techniques (i.e., standalone)
3. A training phase for the user activity
4. The Authentication Experience Questionnaire to collect data on authentication alone
5. A training phase for the Dual-Task Interference game (i.e., DTI game)
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6. The DTI game (Administered in six sessions)
7. The Authentication Experience Questionnaire a second time to collect data on authen-
ticating while multi-tasking
For this study we chose to make the user activity simulate a conversation, to represent
the common use case of authentication interrupting conversation. To mimic a conversation,
participants repeated a series of words. The accuracy of correctly repeating these words
was recorded, and participants acquired two points for each correct word. Each conversation
lasted five minutes and used the same series of words. There were a total of six conversations,
for a total of thirty minutes. For the remainder of this paper, these conversations will be
described as the DTI game or multi-tasking game.
Participants also accumulated more points by successfully performing the authentications
required. Each successful authentication earned ten points. In order for the participants to
know each authentication result, it was displayed for two seconds.
To get familiarized with the various components of the experiment, participants went
through three training phases. In the first training phase, participants repeated a series
of words for thirty seconds to simulate a conversation. The second phase required the
participants to perform each of the authentication methods twice. In the third training
phase participants had to repeat words while authenticating for one and a half minutes (i.e.,
practice the multi-tasking game).
To collect participants’ feedback, the Authentication Experience Questionnaire (AEQ),
was given twice. The questionnaire was given once after participants performed the first
training phase (i.e., authentication methods training), and a second time after the multi-
tasking game. This repetition allows for comparison between authentication performed in a
standalone manner versus during the DTI game.
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The participant’s score was the only incentive for participants to perform the experiment
properly. The score was updated and displayed in real time during the game. After each
conversation of the game the participant could see the score earned and take a break. At
the end of the experiment the compensation was calculated from the best score obtained
between all six games. Each successful authentication earned 10 points and each successful
audio task earned 2 points.
3.5 Hardware Specification
To complete the experiment, participants used a laptop and a smart-phone provided.
The server (i.e., authenticator) was also deployed on the same laptop. The following is the
hardware specification of these devices:
• Laptop: Dell Windows 10, memory 8GB, processor i5-7200U 2 cores at 2.5 GHz, and
a 13 inch screen size.
• Phone: LG V20 with 4GB of memory, a 1.6GHz quad-core processor, Android 7, and
a 5.7 inch screen size.
One relevant specification of the hardware here is the placement of the fingerprint scanner,
which was located on the back of the smart-phone.
3.6 Limitations
The demographic data shows that most participants were female (73%), college students
(100%), and relatively young (100% are under 22 years old). Thus, the data obtained is
more useful at predicting usability in female college students than any other group.
Technologically, each individual’s comfort with the specific hardware aspects of the ex-
periment can be considered a confounding variable. Many of our participants use Apple
products such as the iPhone and Mac computer. The level of comfort these participants had
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with our Android phone and Windows computer may not match that which they typically
feel for their personal devices. For example, the screen size of both the laptop and the phone
may differ from the ones the participants are used to. Additionally the collection of each
participant’s response to an authentication task was contingent on the processing power of
the hardware used. This contingency can create a confounding variable related to the quality
of the devices used in the study.
The audio component of the framework meant to simulate a conversation being had while
authentication was simultaneously performed may also represent a limitation for our frame-
work. Conversations often involve more than simply repeating words. Indeed, while this
task still adequately serves as a second task, demanding at least some level of attention and
inducing a multitask response from participants, its comparability to real life conversations
is not optimal.
Gamification has limitations in terms of accustomization and age of participants. There-
fore, the study should not be assessed multiple times for the same participant. The demo-
graphic data shows that the participants were relatively young, thus the age of the partici-
pants was not a concern in this regard. 19 years old 16 36%
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Chapter 4: Results and Analysis
This chapter presents a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the data collected during
the experiment.
4.1 Efficiency: Completion Time
The completion times are calculated from the start of the first user action to the reception
of the authentication result.
Table 4.1 details the completion times for both the practice and multi-tasking game.
Authentication tasks appear to participants in a random order. This design decision resulted
in a similar number of authentication methods per participant. Therefore, the averages are
weighted per participant.
Most completion times improved from the practice to the multi-tasking game, which can
presumably be a result of participants’ accustomization.
Table 4.1: Comparison of completion times for each authentication technique evaluated.
Completion times (seconds)
Standalone Multi-tasking game
Authentication methods Average Median Average Median
Fingerprint 3.25 2.28 1.50 1.17
Password (laptop) 8.83 8.12 5.96 5.13
Password (phone) 9.25 8.75 6.78 4.99
Coauthentication (laptop) 0.68 0.63 0.74 0.49
Coauthentication (phone) 1.09 0.92 0.83 0.61
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Table 4.2: Success rates for fingerprint and password authentication techniques weighted
per participants.
Authentication Success Rate (%)
Authentication method Standalone Multi-tasking
Fingerprint 99.95 99.99
Password (laptop) 99.92 99.95
Password (phone) 99.86 99.95
4.2 Effectiveness: Success Rate
The success rate provides a metric for authentication effectiveness, which is determined
by participants successfully initiating the authentication process and the reception of a suc-
cessful authentication result. Table 4.2 shows the success rate for both the practice and the
multi-tasking game.
Table 4.2 does not include coauthentication because, in a controlled environment (e.g.,
the elimination of network problems), coauthentication could not fail. In a more practical
scenario network problems may be inevitable and coauthentication may fail. To ensure the
completion of the experiment, the network had to be stable, thus coauthentication was not
impacted by potential network issues.
The experiment was designed for participants to become well accustomed to the various
tasks required and is the reason for such high accuracy. The authentication task training
is not timed and is meant to be successful for the participant to understand what is re-
quired to be performed by each authentication method. Additionally, the data collected
indicates that the success rate increased throughout the experiment. Indeed, during the
multi-tasking game, more than 60% of failed authentication attempts appeared in the first
two conversations (i.e., the first 10 minutes).
An important point about the fingerprint scanner success rate is that Android’s policy
requires multiple scans of a fingerprint to register a user, which increases the chance of
success. Additionally, there was only one registered user.
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Table 4.3: Averages of System Usability Scale scores of the authentication methods
evaluated.
SUS Score
Authentication method Standalone Multi-tasking
Fingerprint 88 82
Password (laptop) 81 76
Password (phone) 78 74
Coauthentication (laptop) 81 82
Coauthentication (phone) 81 82
4.3 Satisfaction: Subjective Usability
The System Usability Scale (SUS) was used to measure the satisfaction of the partic-
ipants. The SUS questionnaire was assessed within the Authentication Experience Ques-
tionnaire two times, a first time after the practice of the authentication task performed in a
standalone manner and a second time after the DTI game. These SUS scores are shown in
Table 4.3.
Fingerprint is highly rated in both standalone and during the multi-tasking game. The
high score of the fingerprint authentication during the standalone portion can be explained
by the high percentage of participants currently using fingerprint authentication in their daily
life. Indeed, 72% of the participants enrolled stated to be using fingerprint authentication.
Coauthentication has an important improvement, from standalone to multi-tasking, which
we believe is due to the novelty of this authentication method.
Password on phone’s low SUS score is likely a result of the increased difficulty to type
on virtual keyboards [85].
4.4 Additional Results
The accuracy of the words repeated was collected to identify difficult words for future
experiments. Table 4.4 shows the accuracy only for words under ninety percent accuracy.
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Table 4.4: Accuracy of words repeated (only for words under 90% accuracy).
Words to repeat accuracy (in %)
fuss 34
lot 63
pat 75
keep 76
pop 79
sew 83
pay 88
sheep 89
Low accuracy rates can result from several factors: 1. The length of the word. Shorter
words can be misheard or confused with other similar words. 2. The uncommonality of the
words. 3. The non-native English speaker may have more trouble with pronunciation. In
our study we have 18% of non-native speakers. 4. The audio may not be clear enough on
some words.
The word “fuss” was correctly repeated only ∼ 34% of the time, which can be a result
of a combination of these factors.
Since authentication requirement points are purposely weighted higher than the audio
tasks (10 points versus 2 points), participants may choose to not repeat words to successfully
perform an authentication task, thus accumulating more points.
Figure 4.1, shows the participants enrolled in the study that use each authentication
method in their daily lives. The Technology and Authentication Experience questionnaire,
included in the Participant Information Questionnaire (see Appendix A), makes a clear
distinction between long and short passwords. A short password is explained as at most 6
typed characters, or passwords based on swiping a particular pattern, or making some sort of
gesture, including passwords and PINs to log into phones, ATM, etc., while a long password
is explained as at least 7 typed characters.
54
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Long password
Short password
Fingerprint
42 (95%)
40 (91%)
32 (73%)
Number of Participants
Figure 4.1: Percentage of participants that use each authentication method in their daily
lives.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
5.1 Authentication Usability Methodology
Researchers mostly focus on improving current authentication techniques’ usability by
focusing within a specific type of authentication. For example, in the case of passwords,
various composition policies (i.e. combination requirement for strengthening passwords)
are required by different systems which lead researchers to focus specifically on studying the
usability of password combination policies [43]. This specificity is not amenable to other types
of authentication techniques. In biometric authentication methods, the necessary action for a
user’s authentication usually involves the required biometric feature to be scanned. Therefore
the satisfaction aspect of biometrics is not the main concern. However, the False Acceptance
Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR) are metrics used to compare one technique
to another. These metrics represent the accuracy of such methods, but FAR is usually not
applicable for non-biometric authentication techniques. In the case of security tokens, their
usability is not well studied. This is a likely result of a more complicated experimental setup
for such study.
All of the methodologies described in Section 3.2.1 are appropriate for the goals of their
respective papers. However, such methodologies are often not applicable for different type
of techniques.
The results of the study described in Chapter 4 show that fingerprint and coauthentica-
tion (both laptop and phone) are the more usable techniques evaluated. Their satisfaction
and efficiency results are significantly better than passwords, though we are unable to draw
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conclusions regarding the effectiveness due to the similarity in results. Coauthentication
yielded higher efficiency results than fingerprint. However, the satisfaction results of finger-
print are overall better or as good as coauthentication (both laptop and phone).
The framework developed enables the uniform evaluation of authentication methods’
usability by using a standard methodology across various authentication factors, by focusing
on efficiency, effectiveness, and satisfaction.
5.2 Coauthentication
The coauthentication protocols and system designs have several potential benefits. Coau-
thentication:
• protects against compromise of any one authentication secret, similar to multi-factor
techniques but without the inconveniences of having to enter passwords (including
OTPs) or scan biometrics;
• requires little, and in some implementations no, interaction from users;
• mitigates phishing, replay, and man-in-the-middle attacks (there are no passwords to
phish, and the attack models assume active attackers);
• bases authentications on high-entropy secrets that can be generated, exchanged, stored,
updated, and used automatically and efficiently (in contrast with password and bio-
metric secrets);
• can implement advanced functionalities, includingm-out-of-n, continuous, group, shared-
device, and anonymous authentications;
• has formally verified security properties;
• has been implemented and found to perform efficiently enough to be practical;
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• can be combined with additional authentication factors; and
• provides protocols that may benefit existing multi-device authentication systems, such
as those based on OTPs.
Another benefit of coauthentication is its ability to reset secrets automatically. With
existing systems, if a nonuser does obtain the required secrets, then resetting the secrets
is laborious (e.g., for the victim to reset a password), expensive (e.g., to send the user a
new physical token), or impractical (e.g., to give a user new fingerprints, retinas, vocal
profile, etc). In contrast, coauthentication secrets may be cryptographic keys stored on
registered devices; these keys may be reset, and periodically updated, automatically. These
keys can also be generated to have high entropy, without concern for whether users can
create, memorize, or enter the high-entropy secrets.
Because users never enter coauthentication secrets, these secrets cannot be phished by
convincing users to enter them. In contrast, passwords are often obtained by convincing
users to enter them as part of phishing attacks [12].
By providing an inexpensive, easy-to-use, and easy-to-deploy system of continuous au-
thentication, coauthentication may enable applications like the following. Suppose that
a number of terminals are distributed throughout a medical-care facility. The terminals
actively poll nearby devices (e.g., through NFC or Bluetooth) for a new user, coauthenti-
cate when one is found (without user interaction), and then display data allowable for that
coauthenticated user with continuous coauthentication occurring (e.g., with a new coauthen-
tication of the user every 20s). Then a physician might walk up to a terminal and without
interaction or inconvenience—only by virtue of having his or her registered devices, like a
smart ring, smart phone, and smart shoes—be able to see the current patient’s medical
records. When the physician leaves the terminal’s proximity, the terminal may go blank and
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await the next user. If the next user is a coauthenticated station-prep attendant, then data
specific for that user may be displayed.
5.3 Future Work
5.3.1 Coauthentication
Coauthentication can be implemented with various protocols and policies and with little-
to-no user interaction. We hypothesize that coauthentication mechanisms may have im-
proved usability when compared to existing multi-factor mechanisms. We presented a frame-
work showing the usability advantages of two coauthentication implementations. This frame-
work gave a promising evaluation of multiple authentication techniques. Coauthentication
could be compared to some multi-factor implementations following the same methodology.
Coauthentication can be implemented for various applications and allows the integration
of various features in the protocol. The following is a non-exhaustive list of additional
modifications to coauthentication:
• Shared Association of Devices: In some implementations, a device could be shared
between two users. For example, a device can be shared between both Alice and Bob.
In this case, an insider attack could occur, thus the assumption is made that Alice
will not attempt to usurp Bob’s identity. For instance, if Alice has D1 and D2 for
associated devices and Bob has D2 and D3, they can both access the system with
D2 and their respective additional device. However, the authentication cannot be
successfully performed by using only D1 and D3.
• Device duplication: A device can be purposefully duplicated to serve as a backup. One
disadvantage is an additional attack vector for each duplicated device.
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• Continuous Authentication: In the case where no interaction is required from the
user, continuous authentication can have benefits. Indeed, session keys could have a
shortened duration and the protocol could be repeated in a relatively short amount of
time. Requiring a user to enter their password every minute or even every hour would
incur a greater annoyance, thus would negatively impact the usability of systems with
such a policy. Thus the importance of a zero-interaction implementation for continuous
authentication is necessary for usability. As previously explained coauthentication can
be a zero-interaction technique which would be suitable for continuous authentication.
• Multi-factor Authentication: An additional factor could be required to strengthen the
authentication implementation. For example, a user could be required to scan their
fingerprint in addition to succesfully completing the coauthentication process. Due
to the increasing number of smartphones that support fingerprint scanners, such a
scheme is possible, and as seen in Chapter 4, the usability may be better than coupling
coauthentication with a password.
• Group authentication: A set of registered devices could be considered a registered
group. This group could comprise multiple users required to authenticate with a few
number of devices. For example, Alice and Bob each have two devices that could
belong to the group and when the coauthentication is successfully performed, the
authenticator identifies the user as a member of the group and not as an individual.
• Anonymous authentication: The notion of group authentication and shared devices
can enable the anonymity of the individual users authenticated. Indeed, in the case
where Alice and Bob share registered devices, the authenticator may not be able to
identify a specific user of a group (or choose to not retain this information).
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5.3.2 Authentication Methods Usability
The framework introduced here compiles compelling results in adopting such a framework
for usability studies of authentication methods. Further investigation should strengthen this
framework.
Investigating the usability of multi-factor authentication methods could generate unfore-
seen insight. Multi-factored authentication methods suffer from the disadvantage of each
combined factor, but without running an experiment it is difficult to predict which combi-
nation would yield better result over another.
Several extensions exist for using the framework to evaluate authentication methods’
usability in different contexts: through varying user activities, game design principles, or the
authentication methods themselves.
Many user activities are obstructed by authentication requirements everyday, thus ensu-
ing studies could modify the difficulty and the type of the activity simulated.
The activity simulated in the study presented was a conversation; however, simulating a
conversation by having participants repeat words may not require enough cognitive load. The
difficulty of this task can be adjusted to collect data and investigate the resulting effect(s).
The following are potential modifications that would result in a different difficulty level:
1. The sets of words can be categorized based on a difficulty level.
2. The speed of the audio can be accelerated to increase the difficulty.
3. The sets of words during the experiment can appear in a randomized order.
4. The auditory task can be replaced with full sentences or questions.
All of these combinations are avenues to explore, to determine the effects of Dual-Task
Interference and cognitive load while authenticating.
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Additional game-design concepts can be included in the framework to further engage
participant interest. For example, a leaderboard displayed during each break can provide
feedback to participants on their performance compared to each other; several participants,
during the trials, expressed interest in knowing how their scores compared to previous sub-
jects. This particular gamification design is, therefore, one that should be considered in
future related studies.
Another possible extension relates to setting a password for participants. In the exper-
iment presented here, the participants’ password was given, which was meant to prevent
any “weak” password creations [85]. However, it cannot yet be determined whether having
participants create their own passwords would significantly impact the study’s results.
62
References
[1] Jay Ligatti, Cagri Cetin, Shamaria Engram, Jean-Baptiste Subils, and Dmitry Goldgof.
Coauthentication. In Proceedings of the 34rd Annual ACM Symposium on Applied
Computing, pages 1906–1915. ACM, 2019.
[2] Hassan Khan, Urs Hengartner, and Daniel Vogel. Usability and security perceptions
of implicit authentication: Convenient, secure, sometimes annoying. In SOUPS, pages
225–239, 2015.
[3] Joseph Bonneau, Cormac Herley, Paul C Van Oorschot, and Frank Stajano. The quest
to replace passwords: A framework for comparative evaluation of web authentication
schemes. In 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 553–567. IEEE,
2012.
[4] Lawrence O’Gorman. Comparing passwords, tokens, and biometrics for user authenti-
cation. Proceedings of the IEEE, 91(12):2021–2040, December 2003.
[5] Catherine S Weir, Gary Douglas, Martin Carruthers, and Mervyn Jack. User perceptions
of security, convenience and usability for ebanking authentication tokens. Computers &
Security, 28(1):47–62, 2009.
[6] Cagri Cetin, Jay Ligatti, and Dmitry Goldgof. SQL-Identifier injection attacks. In 2019
IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS) (IEEE CNS 2019),
2019.
63
[7] Mehmet Aktukmak, Yasin Yilmaz, and Ismail Uysal. Quick and accurate attack detec-
tion in recommender systems through user attributes. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM
Conference on Recommender Systems, RecSys ’19, pages 348–352, New York, NY, USA,
2019. ACM.
[8] National Institute of Standards and Technology. Back to basics: Multi-
factor authentication (MFA), November 2016. https://www.nist.gov/itl/tig/
back-basics-multi-factor-authentication.
[9] Paul Grassi, James Fenton, Elaine Newton, Ray Perlner, Andrew Regenscheid, William
Burr, Justin Richer, Naomi Lefkovitz, Jamie Danker, Yee-Yin Choong, Kristen Greene,
and Mary Theofanos. NIST special publication 800-63B digital authentication guideline,
June 2017. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-63b.
[10] David M’Raihi, Salah Machani, Mingliang Pei, and Johan Rydell. TOTP: Time-based
one-time password algorithm. RFC 6238, May 2011. http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/
rfc6238.txt.
[11] M Angela Sasse, Sacha Brostoff, and Dirk Weirich. Transforming the ‘weakest link’–a
human/computer interaction approach to usable and effective security. BT Technology
Journal, 19(3):122–131, July 2001.
[12] Dinei Florencio and Cormac Herley. A large-scale study of web password habits. In
Proceedings of the International Conference on World Wide Web, pages 657–666, May
2007.
[13] Philip G Inglesant and M Angela Sasse. The true cost of unusable password policies:
Password use in the wild. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors
in Computing Systems, pages 383–392, April 2010.
64
[14] Florian Schaub, Ruben Deyhle, and Michael Weber. Password entry usability and
shoulder surfing susceptibility on different smartphone platforms. In Proceedings of
the 11th international conference on mobile and ubiquitous multimedia, page 10. ACM,
2012.
[15] William Melicher, Darya Kurilova, Sean M Segreti, Pranshu Kalvani, Richard Shay,
Blase Ur, Lujo Bauer, Nicolas Christin, Lorrie Faith Cranor, and Michelle L Mazurek.
Usability and security of text passwords on mobile devices. In Proceedings of the Con-
ference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, pages 527–539, May 2016.
[16] Nancy Gibbs. Your life is fully mobile. TIME, August 2012. http://techland.time.com/
2012/08/16/your-life-is-fully-mobile/.
[17] John Brooke et al. Sus-a quick and dirty usability scale. Usability evaluation in industry,
189(194):4–7, 1996.
[18] Scott Ruoti and Kent E Seamons. Standard metrics and scenarios for usable authenti-
cation. In WAY@ SOUPS, 2016.
[19] Aaron Bangor, Philip Kortum, and James Miller. Determining what individual sus
scores mean: Adding an adjective rating scale. Journal of usability studies, 4(3):114–
123, 2009.
[20] Jean-Baptiste Subils, Joseph Perez, Peiwei Liu, Shamaria Engram, Cagri Cetin, Dmitry
Goldgof, Natalie Ebner, Daniela Oliveira, and Jay Ligatti. A dual-task interference
game-based experimental framework for comparing the usability of authentication meth-
ods. In 12th International Conference on Human System Interaction (HSI). IEEE, 2019.
65
[21] Harold Pashler. Dual-task interference and elementary mental mechanisms. Attention
and performance XIV: Synergies in experimental psychology, artificial intelligence, and
cognitive neuroscience, pages 245–264, 1993.
[22] Harold Pashler. Dual-task interference in simple tasks: data and theory. Psychological
bulletin, 116(2):220, 1994.
[23] Juho Hamari. Do badges increase user activity? a field experiment on the effects of
gamification. Computers in human behavior, 71:469–478, 2017.
[24] Gabriel Barata, Sandra Gama, Joaquim Jorge, and Daniel Gonc¸alves. Improving par-
ticipation and learning with gamification. In Proceedings of the First International
Conference on gameful design, research, and applications, pages 10–17. ACM, 2013.
[25] Juho Hamari, Jonna Koivisto, and Harri Sarsa. Does gamification work?–a literature
review of empirical studies on gamification. In 2014 47th Hawaii international conference
on system sciences (HICSS), pages 3025–3034. IEEE, 2014.
[26] Bruno Blanchet. An efficient cryptographic protocol verifier based on prolog rules. In
Proceedings of the IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 82–96, June
2001.
[27] Bruno Blanchet. ProVerif: Cryptographic protocol verifier in the formal model, 2016.
http://prosecco.gforge.inria.fr/personal/bblanche/proverif/.
[28] Kresimir Delac and Mislav Grgic. A survey of biometric recognition methods. In 46th
International Symposium Electronics in Marine, volume 46, pages 16–18, 2004.
[29] John Brooke. Sus: a retrospective. Journal of usability studies, 8(2):29–40, 2013.
66
[30] Jarred Adam Ligatti, Dmitry Goldgof, Cagri Cetin, and Jean-Baptiste Subils. Sys-
tem and methods for authentication using multiple devices, May 23 2017. US Patent
9,659,160.
[31] Jarred Adam Ligatti, Dmitry Goldgof, Cagri Cetin, and Jean-Baptiste Subils. Systems
and methods for anonymous authentication using multiple devices, June 28 2016. US
Patent 9,380,058.
[32] Jay Ligatti, Cagri Cetin, Shamaria Engram, Jean-Baptiste Subils, and Dmitry Goldgof.
Coauthentication. In Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Applied Computing (SAC),
April 2019.
[33] Jay Ligatti, Cagri Cetin, Shamaria Engram, Jean-Baptiste Subils, and Dmitry Goldgof.
Coauthentication. Technical Report Technical Report CSE-SEC-092418, University of
South Florida, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, September 2018.
http://www.cse.usf.edu/∼ligatti/papers/CoauthTR-092418.pdf.
[34] Jay Ligatti, Cagri Cetin, Shamaria Engram, Jean-Baptiste Subils, and Dmitry Gold-
gof. Coauthentication. Technical Report Auth-7-17-17, University of South Florida,
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, July 2017. http://www.cse.usf.edu/
∼ligatti/papers/coauth-TR.pdf.
[35] Cagri Cetin. Authentication and SQL-Injection Prevention Techniques in Web Appli-
cations. PhD thesis, University of South Florida, 2019.
[36] Mark D Corner and Brian D Noble. Zero-Interaction authentication. In Proceedings of
the ACM International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, pages 1–11,
September 2002.
67
[37] Geneva Belford, Steve Bunch, John Day, Peter Alsberg, Deborah Brown, Enrique
Grapa, David Healy, and John Mullen. A state-of-the-art report on network data
management and related technology. Technical Report 150, Center for Advanced
Computation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, April 1975. Page 132.
https://archive.org/details/stateoftheartrep150belf.
[38] International Standards Organization. Information technology – Trusted platform mod-
ule library – Part 1: Architecture. Technical report, August 2015. ISO/IEC 11889-
1:2015. https://www.iso.org/standard/66510.html.
[39] Cagri Cetin and Jay Ligatti. ProVerif coauthentication files, December 2018. https:
//github.com/Coauthentication/FormalModels.
[40] Bruno Blanchet, Ben Smyth, Vincent Cheval, and Marc Sylvestre. ProVerif 1.98pl1:
Automatic cryptographic protocol verifier, user manual and tutorial, December 2017.
http://prosecco.gforge.inria.fr/personal/bblanche/proverif/manual.pdf.
[41] Thomas Y.C. Woo and Simon S. Lam. A semantic model for authentication protocols.
In Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, pages 178–194,
1993.
[42] John Dunning. Taming the blue beast: A survey of bluetooth-based threats. IEEE
Security & Privacy, 8(2):20–27, 2010.
[43] Richard Shay, Saranga Komanduri, Adam L Durity, Phillip Seyoung Huh, Michelle L
Mazurek, Sean M Segreti, Blase Ur, Lujo Bauer, Nicolas Christin, and Lorrie Faith
Cranor. Can long passwords be secure and usable? In Proceedings of the SIGCHI
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, pages 2927–2936. ACM, 2014.
68
[44] Richard Shay, Lujo Bauer, Nicolas Christin, Lorrie Faith Cranor, Alain Forget, Saranga
Komanduri, Michelle L Mazurek, William Melicher, Sean M Segreti, and Blase Ur. A
spoonful of sugar?: The impact of guidance and feedback on password-creation behavior.
In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, pages
2903–2912, April 2015.
[45] Department of Defense. Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP),
September 1990. DoD 5100.52-M. https://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/dod/
5100-52m/chap15.pdf.
[46] Margaret Woodward. Air force instruction 91-104, April 2013. https://fas.org/irp/
doddir/usaf/afi91-104.pdf.
[47] Michael Reed, Paul Syverson, and David Goldschlag. Anonymous connections and onion
routing. IEEE Journal on Selected areas in Communications, 16(4):482–494, 1998.
[48] Adi Shamir. How to share a secret. Communications of the ACM, 22(11):612–613,
November 1979.
[49] Mihir Bellare and Gregory Neven. Identity-based multi-signatures from RSA. In Pro-
ceedings of the Cryptographers’ Track at the RSA Conference, pages 145–162. Springer,
February 2007.
[50] Radhesh Krishnan Konoth, Victor van der Veen, and Herbert Bos. How anywhere
computing just killed your phone-based two-factor authentication, 2016. http://fc16.
ifca.ai/preproceedings/24 Konoth.pdf.
[51] Charles McColgan. Issues with SMS deprecation rationale, September 2016. https:
//github.com/usnistgov/800-63-3/issues/351.
69
[52] Tiano Freixas Lopez Lecube, Josh Miller, Thomas Jaeger, Sam Oh, Wenhan Zhao, and
Eric Min. Multi-device authentication, 2015. US Patent Application 2017/0093846 A1.
[53] Joseph Bonneau, Cormac Herley, Paul C van Oorschot, and Frank Stajano. The quest
to replace passwords: A framework for comparative evaluation of web authentication
schemes. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 553–567, 2012.
[54] Daniel Peralta, Mikel Galar, Isaac Triguero, Daniel Paternain, Salvador Garc´ıa, Edurne
Barrenechea, Jose´ M Ben´ıtez, Humberto Bustince, and Francisco Herrera. A survey on
fingerprint minutiae-based local matching for verification and identification: Taxonomy
and experimental evaluation. Information Sciences, 315:67–87, 2015.
[55] Mitja Rutnik. Over 70 percent of smartphones shipped in 2018 will have fingerprint
sensors — report, 2017.
[56] Yulong Zhang, Zhaonfeng Chen, Hui Xue, and Tao Wei. Fingerprints on mobile devices:
Abusing and leaking. In Black Hat Conference, 2015.
[57] Android developers, fingerprint specifications. https://source.android.com/security/
authentication/fingerprint-hal.
[58] Burt Kaliski. Pkcs# 5: Password-based cryptography specification version 2.0. Techni-
cal report, 2000.
[59] Kathleen Moriarty, Burt Kaliski, and Andreas Rusch. Pkcs# 5: Password-based cryp-
tography specification version 2.1. Technical report, 2017.
[60] Meltem So¨nmez Turan, Elaine Barker, William Burr, and Lily Chen. Recommendation
for password-based key derivation. NIST special publication, 800:132, 2010.
70
[61] Wayne C Summers and Edward Bosworth. Password policy: the good, the bad, and
the ugly. In Proceedings of the winter international synposium on Information and
communication technologies, pages 1–6. Trinity College Dublin, 2004.
[62] Richard Shay, Saranga Komanduri, Patrick Gage Kelley, Pedro Giovanni Leon,
Michelle L Mazurek, Lujo Bauer, Nicolas Christin, and Lorrie Faith Cranor. Encoun-
tering stronger password requirements: user attitudes and behaviors. In Proceedings of
the Sixth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, page 2. ACM, 2010.
[63] Erik Frøkjær, Morten Hertzum, and Kasper Hornbæk. Measuring usability: are effec-
tiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction really correlated? In Proceedings of the SIGCHI
conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, pages 345–352. ACM, 2000.
[64] Kasper Hornbæk. Current practice in measuring usability: Challenges to usability
studies and research. International journal of human-computer studies, 64(2):79–102,
2006.
[65] Nigel Bevan. Measuring usability as quality of use. Software Quality Journal, 4(2):115–
130, 1995.
[66] Kevin A Juang, Sanjay Ranganayakulu, and Joel S Greenstein. Using system-generated
mnemonics to improve the usability and security of password authentication. In Pro-
ceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, volume 56,
pages 506–510. SAGE Publications Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA, 2012.
[67] Anne M Gadermann, Martin Guhn, and Bruno D Zumbo. Estimating ordinal reliability
for likert-type and ordinal item response data: A conceptual, empirical, and practical
guide. Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation, 17(3):1–13, 2012.
71
[68] Thomas S Tullis and Jacqueline N Stetson. A comparison of questionnaires for assessing
website usability. In Usability professional association conference, volume 1, 2004.
[69] Scott Ruoti, Nathan Kim, Ben Burgon, Timothy Van Der Horst, and Kent Seamons.
Confused johnny: when automatic encryption leads to confusion and mistakes. In
Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, page 5. ACM,
2013.
[70] John P Chin, Virginia A Diehl, and Kent L Norman. Development of an instrument
measuring user satisfaction of the human-computer interface. In Proceedings of the
SIGCHI conference on Human factors in computing systems, pages 213–218. ACM,
1988.
[71] James R Lewis. Ibm computer usability satisfaction questionnaires: psychometric eval-
uation and instructions for use. International Journal of Human-Computer Interaction,
7(1):57–78, 1995.
[72] Joey Benedek and Trish Miner. Measuring desirability: New methods for evaluating
desirability in a usability lab setting. Proceedings of Usability Professionals Association,
2003(8-12):57, 2002.
[73] Markus Jakobsson, Elaine Shi, Philippe Golle, and Richard Chow. Implicit authentica-
tion for mobile devices. In Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Hot topics in
security, pages 9–9, 2009.
[74] John M Carroll and John C Thomas. Fun. ACM SIGCHI Bulletin, 19(3):21–24, 1988.
[75] Noam Tractinsky. Aesthetics and apparent usability: empirically assessing cultural
and methodological issues. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGCHI Conference on Human
factors in computing systems, pages 115–122. ACM, 1997.
72
[76] Jenny Preece. Sociability and usability in online communities: Determining and mea-
suring success. Behaviour & Information Technology, 20(5):347–356, 2001.
[77] Donna L Hoffman and Thomas P Novak. Marketing in hypermedia computer-mediated
environments: Conceptual foundations. Journal of marketing, 60(3):50–68, 1996.
[78] Judy Jeng. Usability assessment of academic digital libraries: effectiveness, efficiency,
satisfaction, and learnability. Libri, 55(2-3):96–121, 2005.
[79] Christina Braz and Jean-Marc Robert. Security and usability: the case of the user
authentication methods. In Proceedings of the 18th Conference on l’Interaction Homme-
Machine, pages 199–203. ACM, 2006.
[80] Ben Shneiderman. Designing the user interface: strategies for effective human-computer
interaction. Pearson Education India, 2010.
[81] Sean M Segreti, William Melicher, Saranga Komanduri, Darya Melicher, Richard Shay,
Blase Ur, Lujo Bauer, Nicolas Christin, Lorrie Faith Cranor, and Michelle L Mazurek.
Diversify to survive: Making passwords stronger with adaptive policies. In Symposium
on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS), 2017.
[82] Hana Habib, Pardis Emami Naeini, Summer Devlin, Maggie Oates, Chelse Swoopes,
Lujo Bauer, Nicolas Christin, and Lorrie Faith Cranor. User behaviors and attitudes
under password expiration policies. In Fourteenth Symposium on Usable Privacy and
Security (SOUPS), 2018.
[83] Yinqian Zhang, Fabian Monrose, and Michael K Reiter. The security of modern pass-
word expiration: An algorithmic framework and empirical analysis. In Proceedings of
the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security, pages 176–186.
ACM, 2010.
73
[84] Yee-Yin Choong, Mary Theofanos, and Hung-Kung Liu. United States Federal Employ-
ees’ Password Management Behaviors: A Department of Commerce Case Study. US
Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2014.
[85] Emanuel Von Zezschwitz, Alexander De Luca, and Heinrich Hussmann. Honey, i shrunk
the keys: influences of mobile devices on password composition and authentication per-
formance. In Proceedings of the 8th nordic conference on human-computer interaction:
fun, fast, foundational, pages 461–470. ACM, 2014.
[86] Va´clav Matya´sˇ and Zdeneˇk Rˇ´ıha. Biometric authentication—security and usability. In
Advanced Communications and Multimedia Security, pages 227–239. Springer, 2002.
[87] Christian Rathgeb and Andreas Uhl. A survey on biometric cryptosystems and cance-
lable biometrics. EURASIP Journal on Information Security, 2011(1):3, 2011.
[88] Ravi Subban and Dattatreya P Mankame. A study of biometric approach using finger-
print recognition. Lecture notes on software engineering, 1(2):209, 2013.
[89] Mehmet Aktukmak, Yasin Yilmaz, and Ismail Uysal. A probabilistic framework to
incorporate mixed-data type features: Matrix factorization with multimodal side infor-
mation. Neurocomputing, 08 2019.
[90] M. Aktukmak, S. Mercier, and I. Uysal. A neural net framework for accumulative
feature-based matrix completion. In 2018 International Joint Conference on Neural
Networks (IJCNN), pages 1–6, July 2018.
[91] S. Fang, I. Markwood, and Y. Liu. Wireless-assisted key establishment leveraging chan-
nel manipulation. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 2019.
74
[92] S. Fang, T. Wang, Y. Liu, S. Zhao, and Z. Lu. Entrapment for wireless eavesdroppers.
In IEEE INFOCOM 2019 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, pages
2530–2538, April 2019.
[93] S. Fang, I. Markwood, and Y. Liu. Manipulatable wireless key establishment. In 2017
IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS), pages 1–9, Oct
2017.
[94] T. Wang, Y. Liu, T. Hou, Q. Pei, and S. Fang. Signal entanglement based pinpoint
waveforming for location-restricted service access control. IEEE Transactions on De-
pendable and Secure Computing, 15(5):853–867, Sep. 2018.
[95] S. Fang, Y. Liu, W. Shen, H. Zhu, and T. Wang. Virtual multipath attack and defense
for location distinction in wireless networks. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing,
16(2):566–580, Feb 2017.
[96] S. Fang, Y. Liu, and P. Ning. Mimicry attacks against wireless link signature and new
defense using time-synched link signature. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics
and Security, 11(7):1515–1527, July 2016.
[97] S. Fang, Y. Liu, and P. Ning. Wireless communications under broadband reactive
jamming attacks. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 13(3):394–
408, May 2016.
[98] Song Fang, Ian Markwood, Yao Liu, Shangqing Zhao, Zhuo Lu, and Haojin Zhu. No
training hurdles: Fast training-agnostic attacks to infer your typing. In Proceedings of
the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS
’18, pages 1747–1760, Toronto, Canada, 2018. ACM.
75
[99] Song Fang, Yao Liu, Wenbo Shen, and Haojin Zhu. Where are you from?: Confusing
location distinction using virtual multipath camouflage. In Proceedings of the 20th
Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, MobiCom ’14,
pages 225–236, Maui, Hawaii, USA, 2014. ACM.
76
Appendix A: Participant Information Questionnaire
• Demographics
1. Handedness *
◦ Left
◦ Right
◦ Ambidextrous
2. Gender *
◦ Male
◦ Female
◦ Prefer not to answer
3. Enter your age in number of years *
• Education
4. Native Language *
5. If not English, at what age approximately did you begin to speak/learn English
6. Are you bilingual *
◦ Yes
◦ No
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7. Number of years of education *
8. What is your major? (If you are currently in college) *
• Eligibility
9. Do you have any hearing difficulty? *
◦ Yes
◦ No
10. If yes, please explain:
11. Do you have any visual difficulty? *
◦ Yes
◦ No
12. If yes, please explain
13. Do you wear glasses? *
◦ Yes
◦ No
◦ Sometimes
• Ethnic Category
14. Please check the most appropriate category *
◦ Hispanic or Latino
◦ Not Hispanic or Latino
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• Racial Category
15. Please select all that apply *
0 American Indian or Alaskan Native
0 Asian
0 Black or African American
0 Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
0 White
• Technology and Authentication Experience
16. Approximately how many hours per day do you use a computer (desktop/laptop)?
*
17. Approximately how many hours per day do you use a smartphone? *
18. Approximately how many hours per day do you use an electronic device other than
the ones mentioned above? *
19. If your answer is greater than 0 please list which device(s)?
20. Approximately how many times per day do you type a ”long” password to log into
a device or service? (i.e., at least 7 typed characters) *
21. Approximately how many times per day do you type a ”short” password to log into
a device or service? (i.e., at most 6 typed characters, or passwords based on swiping a
particular pattern, or making some sort of gesture. Including passwords and PINs to
log into phones, ATM, etc.) *
22. Approximately how many times per day do you log into a device or service using
your fingerprint? *
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Appendix B: Authentication Experience Questionnaire
1. Could you hear the words properly during the auditory tasks?
◦ Yes
◦ No
2. I found the audio tasks got in the way of me being able to complete the authentication
tasks
1 2 3 4 5
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
3. I think that I would like to use this system frequently
1 2 3 4 5
Username/password laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Username/password phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Fingerprint phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
4. I found the authentication method unnecessarily complex
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1 2 3 4 5
Username/password laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Username/password phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Fingerprint phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
5. I thought the system was easy to use
1 2 3 4 5
Username/password laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Username/password phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Fingerprint phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
6. I would need the support of a technical person to be able to use this authentication
method
1 2 3 4 5
Username/password laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Username/password phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Fingerprint phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
7. The various functions in this authentication method were well integrated
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1 2 3 4 5
Username/password laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Username/password phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Fingerprint phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
8. I thought there was too much inconsistency in this authentication method
1 2 3 4 5
Username/password laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Username/password phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Fingerprint phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
9. Most people would learn to use this authentication method very quickly
1 2 3 4 5
Username/password laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Username/password phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Fingerprint phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
10. This authentication method is very cumbersome to use
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1 2 3 4 5
Username/password laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Username/password phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Fingerprint phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
11. I felt very confident using this authentication method
1 2 3 4 5
Username/password laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Username/password phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Fingerprint phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
12. I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with this authentication
method
1 2 3 4 5
Username/password laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Username/password phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Fingerprint phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
13. I could complete this authentication task even while I am distracted
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1 2 3 4 5
Username/password laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Username/password phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Fingerprint phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
14. This authentication method was easy to use
1 2 3 4 5
Username/password laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Username/password phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Fingerprint phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
15. This authentication method was fast to use
1 2 3 4 5
Username/password laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Username/password phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Fingerprint phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
16. This authentication method required attention/focus
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1 2 3 4 5
Username/password laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Username/password phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Fingerprint phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
17. This authentication method seemed secure
1 2 3 4 5
Username/password laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Username/password phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Fingerprint phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
18. Please rank the authentication methods in order of your preference from 1 (most pre-
ferred) to 5 (least preferred)
1 2 3 4 5
Username/password laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication laptop ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Username/password phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Coauthentication phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Fingerprint phone ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
85
Appendix C: Auditory Task Words
• Audio Practice: an, bake, in, duck, boat, knee, tray, face, sick
• Multi-tasking game practice: sale, must, pot, math, bad, pay, food, cane, hair, paste,
doll, keep, led, heart, miss, tree, pop, cup, nose, sink, slip, fog, cart, deck, buzz, sheep,
loud, hurt, pass, bee, drop, quick, nest, thank, sled, frog, park, neck, bus
• Multi-tasking game conversation: stop, tea, you, draw, need, oil, book, tick, goat, we,
stay, base, fit, well, best, lot, pat, bug, may, seat, pain, fast, wall, ship, load, dirt,
grass, see, top, quit, pest, tank, slide, grade, mark, poke, fuss, spot, toe, rat, show,
lead, fell, coat, glove, road, hope, lake, tell, wet, feel, bad, care, fruit, nest, chip, gave,
five, ice, ran, frog, soft, pink, tent, milk, bake, room, ant, woke, hand, sheep, read,
bed, bus, mud, night, some, gone, move, gold, mean, last, hat, meet, on, weed, due,
am, say, mind, off, has, mile, must, bat, two, row, shop, lie, when, wade, hose, grow,
are, south, sew, date, touch, hop, wipe, truck, dark, day, pot, save, right, does, thing,
cry, park, neck, key, fat, shoe, tall, feed
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Appendix D: Institutional Review Board Authorization
The IRB approval below is for the usability experiment.
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12/11/2018  
 
Jean-Baptiste Subils 
Computer Science and Engineering  
8411 Del Rio Way 
unit 478 
Tampa, FL 33617 
 
RE: 
 
Expedited Approval for Continuing Review 
IRB#: CR1_Pro00032867 
Title: Authentication Performance and Usability Study 
 
Study Approval Period: 12/21/2018 to 12/21/2019 
Dear Mr. Subils: 
 
On 12/7/2018, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed and APPROVED the above 
application and all documents contained within including those outlined below. 
Approved Item(s): 
Protocol Document(s): 
AuthenticationStudyVersion#1Date11/16/2017 
 
 
 
The IRB determined that your study qualified for expedited review based on federal expedited 
category number(s): 
(7) Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior (including, but not limited to, 
research on perception, cognition, motivation, identity, language, communication, cultural 
beliefs or practices, and social behavior) or research employing survey, interview, oral history, 
focus group, program evaluation, human factors evaluation, or quality assurance methodologies. 
 
As the principal investigator of this study, it is your responsibility to conduct this study in 
accordance with USF HRPP policies and procedures and as approved by the USF IRB. Any 
changes to the approved research must be submitted to the IRB for review and approval by an 
amendment. Additionally, all unanticipated problems must be reported to the USF IRB within 
five (5) business days. 
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We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subject research at the University 
of South Florida and your continued commitment to human research protections.  If you have 
any questions regarding this matter, please call 813-974-5638. 
 
Sincerely, 
   
Kristen Salomon, Ph.D., Chairperson  
USF Institutional Review Board 
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Appendix E: Copyright Permissions
The chapters 3 and 4, sections 1.3, 1.4.2 and 5.3.2, and their figures and tables are, in part
or as a whole, copyrighted material c© 2019 IEEE [20].In reference to IEEE copyrighted mate-
rial which is used with permission in this thesis, the IEEE does not endorse any of University
of South Florida’s products or services. Internal or personal use of this material is permitted.
If interested in reprinting/republishing IEEE copyrighted material for advertising or promo-
tional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution, please go
to http://www.ieee.org/publications standards/publications/rights/rights link.html to learn
how to obtain a License from RightsLink.
The permission below is for the Coauthentication published paper [32] which is used in
parts for Chapter 5 and its figures and tables, Sections 1.1, 5.2, and 5.3.1.
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ACM (Association for Computing Machinery) LICENSE
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
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This is a License Agreement between Jean-Baptiste Subils ("You") and ACM (Association
for Computing Machinery) ("ACM (Association for Computing Machinery)") provided by
Copyright Clearance Center ("CCC"). The license consists of your order details, the terms
and conditions provided by ACM (Association for Computing Machinery), and the payment
terms and conditions.
All payments must be made in full to CCC. For payment instructions, please see
information listed at the bottom of this form.
License Number 4631110354647
License date Jul 06, 2019
Licensed content publisher ACM (Association for Computing Machinery)
Licensed content title Proceedings, Association for Computing Machinery
Licensed content date Jan 1, 1900
Type of Use Thesis/Dissertation
Requestor type Author of requested content
Format Electronic
Portion chapter/article
The requesting
person/organization is:
myself
Title or numeric reference of
the portion(s)
Coauthentication as a whole with edits
Title of the article or chapter
the portion is from
N/A
Editor of portion(s) N/A
Author of portion(s) N/A
Volume of serial or
monograph.
N/A
Issue, if republishing an
article from a serial
N/A
Page range of the portion
Publication date of portion N/A
Rights for Main product
Duration of use Life of current edition
Creation of copies for the
disabled
no
With minor editing privileges yes
For distribution to Worldwide
In the following language(s) Original language of publication
With incidental promotional
use
no
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The lifetime unit quantity of
new product
More than 2,000,000
Title Coauthentication
Institution name University of South Florida
Expected presentation date Sep 2019
Order reference number ISBN: 978-1-4503-5933-7
Billing Type Invoice
Billing Address Jean-Baptiste Subils
14663 Norwood Oaks Dr Apt 104
Tampa, FL 33613
United States
Attn: Jean-Baptiste Subils
Total (may include CCC user
fee)
0.00 USD
Terms and Conditions
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
The following terms are individual to this publisher:
None
Other Terms and Conditions:
STANDARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS
1. Description of Service; Defined Terms. This Republication License enables the User to
obtain licenses for republication of one or more copyrighted works as described in detail on
the relevant Order Confirmation (the “Work(s)”). Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. (“CCC”)
grants licenses through the Service on behalf of the rightsholder identified on the Order
Confirmation (the “Rightsholder”). “Republication”, as used herein, generally means the
inclusion of a Work, in whole or in part, in a new work or works, also as described on the
Order Confirmation. “User”, as used herein, means the person or entity making such
republication.
2. The terms set forth in the relevant Order Confirmation, and any terms set by the
Rightsholder with respect to a particular Work, govern the terms of use of Works in
connection with the Service. By using the Service, the person transacting for a republication
license on behalf of the User represents and warrants that he/she/it (a) has been duly
authorized by the User to accept, and hereby does accept, all such terms and conditions on
behalf of User, and (b) shall inform User of all such terms and conditions. In the event such
person is a “freelancer” or other third party independent of User and CCC, such party shall
be deemed jointly a “User” for purposes of these terms and conditions. In any event, User
shall be deemed to have accepted and agreed to all such terms and conditions if User
republishes the Work in any fashion.
3. Scope of License; Limitations and Obligations.
3.1 All Works and all rights therein, including copyright rights, remain the sole and
exclusive property of the Rightsholder. The license created by the exchange of an Order
Confirmation (and/or any invoice) and payment by User of the full amount set forth on that
document includes only those rights expressly set forth in the Order Confirmation and in
these terms and conditions, and conveys no other rights in the Work(s) to User. All rights not
expressly granted are hereby reserved.
3.2 General Payment Terms: You may pay by credit card or through an account with us
payable at the end of the month. If you and we agree that you may establish a standing
account with CCC, then the following terms apply: Remit Payment to: Copyright Clearance
Center, 29118 Network Place, Chicago, IL 60673-1291. Payments Due: Invoices are payable
upon their delivery to you (or upon our notice to you that they are available to you for
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downloading). After 30 days, outstanding amounts will be subject to a service charge of 1-
1/2% per month or, if less, the maximum rate allowed by applicable law. Unless otherwise
specifically set forth in the Order Confirmation or in a separate written agreement signed by
CCC, invoices are due and payable on “net 30” terms. While User may exercise the rights
licensed immediately upon issuance of the Order Confirmation, the license is automatically
revoked and is null and void, as if it had never been issued, if complete payment for the
license is not received on a timely basis either from User directly or through a payment
agent, such as a credit card company.
3.3 Unless otherwise provided in the Order Confirmation, any grant of rights to User (i) is
“one-time” (including the editions and product family specified in the license), (ii) is non-
exclusive and non-transferable and (iii) is subject to any and all limitations and restrictions
(such as, but not limited to, limitations on duration of use or circulation) included in the
Order Confirmation or invoice and/or in these terms and conditions. Upon completion of the
licensed use, User shall either secure a new permission for further use of the Work(s) or
immediately cease any new use of the Work(s) and shall render inaccessible (such as by
deleting or by removing or severing links or other locators) any further copies of the Work
(except for copies printed on paper in accordance with this license and still in User's stock at
the end of such period).
3.4 In the event that the material for which a republication license is sought includes third
party materials (such as photographs, illustrations, graphs, inserts and similar materials)
which are identified in such material as having been used by permission, User is responsible
for identifying, and seeking separate licenses (under this Service or otherwise) for, any of
such third party materials; without a separate license, such third party materials may not be
used.
3.5 Use of proper copyright notice for a Work is required as a condition of any license
granted under the Service. Unless otherwise provided in the Order Confirmation, a proper
copyright notice will read substantially as follows: “Republished with permission of
[Rightsholder’s name], from [Work's title, author, volume, edition number and year of
copyright]; permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. ” Such notice
must be provided in a reasonably legible font size and must be placed either immediately
adjacent to the Work as used (for example, as part of a by-line or footnote but not as a
separate electronic link) or in the place where substantially all other credits or notices for the
new work containing the republished Work are located. Failure to include the required notice
results in loss to the Rightsholder and CCC, and the User shall be liable to pay liquidated
damages for each such failure equal to twice the use fee specified in the Order Confirmation,
in addition to the use fee itself and any other fees and charges specified.
3.6 User may only make alterations to the Work if and as expressly set forth in the Order
Confirmation. No Work may be used in any way that is defamatory, violates the rights of
third parties (including such third parties' rights of copyright, privacy, publicity, or other
tangible or intangible property), or is otherwise illegal, sexually explicit or obscene. In
addition, User may not conjoin a Work with any other material that may result in damage to
the reputation of the Rightsholder. User agrees to inform CCC if it becomes aware of any
infringement of any rights in a Work and to cooperate with any reasonable request of CCC
or the Rightsholder in connection therewith.
4. Indemnity. User hereby indemnifies and agrees to defend the Rightsholder and CCC, and
their respective employees and directors, against all claims, liability, damages, costs and
expenses, including legal fees and expenses, arising out of any use of a Work beyond the
scope of the rights granted herein, or any use of a Work which has been altered in any
unauthorized way by User, including claims of defamation or infringement of rights of
copyright, publicity, privacy or other tangible or intangible property.
5. Limitation of Liability. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL CCC OR THE
RIGHTSHOLDER BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL OR
INCIDENTAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION DAMAGES FOR
LOSS OF BUSINESS PROFITS OR INFORMATION, OR FOR BUSINESS
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INTERRUPTION) ARISING OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE A WORK,
EVEN IF ONE OF THEM HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
DAMAGES. In any event, the total liability of the Rightsholder and CCC (including their
respective employees and directors) shall not exceed the total amount actually paid by User
for this license. User assumes full liability for the actions and omissions of its principals,
employees, agents, affiliates, successors and assigns.
6. Limited Warranties. THE WORK(S) AND RIGHT(S) ARE PROVIDED “AS IS”. CCC
HAS THE RIGHT TO GRANT TO USER THE RIGHTS GRANTED IN THE ORDER
CONFIRMATION DOCUMENT. CCC AND THE RIGHTSHOLDER DISCLAIM ALL
OTHER WARRANTIES RELATING TO THE WORK(S) AND RIGHT(S), EITHER
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
PURPOSE. ADDITIONAL RIGHTS MAY BE REQUIRED TO USE ILLUSTRATIONS,
GRAPHS, PHOTOGRAPHS, ABSTRACTS, INSERTS OR OTHER PORTIONS OF THE
WORK (AS OPPOSED TO THE ENTIRE WORK) IN A MANNER CONTEMPLATED
BY USER; USER UNDERSTANDS AND AGREES THAT NEITHER CCC NOR THE
RIGHTSHOLDER MAY HAVE SUCH ADDITIONAL RIGHTS TO GRANT.
7. Effect of Breach. Any failure by User to pay any amount when due, or any use by User of
a Work beyond the scope of the license set forth in the Order Confirmation and/or these
terms and conditions, shall be a material breach of the license created by the Order
Confirmation and these terms and conditions. Any breach not cured within 30 days of
written notice thereof shall result in immediate termination of such license without further
notice. Any unauthorized (but licensable) use of a Work that is terminated immediately upon
notice thereof may be liquidated by payment of the Rightsholder's ordinary license price
therefor; any unauthorized (and unlicensable) use that is not terminated immediately for any
reason (including, for example, because materials containing the Work cannot reasonably be
recalled) will be subject to all remedies available at law or in equity, but in no event to a
payment of less than three times the Rightsholder's ordinary license price for the most
closely analogous licensable use plus Rightsholder's and/or CCC's costs and expenses
incurred in collecting such payment.
8. Miscellaneous.
8.1 User acknowledges that CCC may, from time to time, make changes or additions to the
Service or to these terms and conditions, and CCC reserves the right to send notice to the
User by electronic mail or otherwise for the purposes of notifying User of such changes or
additions; provided that any such changes or additions shall not apply to permissions already
secured and paid for.
8.2 Use of User-related information collected through the Service is governed by CCC’s
privacy policy, available online here:
http://www.copyright.com/content/cc3/en/tools/footer/privacypolicy.html.
8.3 The licensing transaction described in the Order Confirmation is personal to User.
Therefore, User may not assign or transfer to any other person (whether a natural person or
an organization of any kind) the license created by the Order Confirmation and these terms
and conditions or any rights granted hereunder; provided, however, that User may assign
such license in its entirety on written notice to CCC in the event of a transfer of all or
substantially all of User’s rights in the new material which includes the Work(s) licensed
under this Service.
8.4 No amendment or waiver of any terms is binding unless set forth in writing and signed
by the parties. The Rightsholder and CCC hereby object to any terms contained in any
writing prepared by the User or its principals, employees, agents or affiliates and purporting
to govern or otherwise relate to the licensing transaction described in the Order
Confirmation, which terms are in any way inconsistent with any terms set forth in the Order
Confirmation and/or in these terms and conditions or CCC's standard operating procedures,
whether such writing is prepared prior to, simultaneously with or subsequent to the Order
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Confirmation, and whether such writing appears on a copy of the Order Confirmation or in a
separate instrument.
8.5 The licensing transaction described in the Order Confirmation document shall be
governed by and construed under the law of the State of New York, USA, without regard to
the principles thereof of conflicts of law. Any case, controversy, suit, action, or proceeding
arising out of, in connection with, or related to such licensing transaction shall be brought, at
CCC's sole discretion, in any federal or state court located in the County of New York, State
of New York, USA, or in any federal or state court whose geographical jurisdiction covers
the location of the Rightsholder set forth in the Order Confirmation. The parties expressly
submit to the personal jurisdiction and venue of each such federal or state court.If you have
any comments or questions about the Service or Copyright Clearance Center, please contact
us at 978-750-8400 or send an e-mail to info@copyright.com.
v 1.1
Questions? customercare@copyright.com or +1-855-239-3415 (toll free in the US) or
+1-978-646-2777.
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